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Abstract
This research takes a social constructivist approach in order to analyze how
identity is used as a political tool, leading to the current civil war in Syria. Identity
plays a great role in the political scene in Syria ever since the French Mandate, in
which the state was broken into an ethnofederal system. Subsequently the French
employed a divide and conquer tactic in order to prevent the unity of Syria therefore
making it easier to establish control. Later on, after multiple coups, Hafiz Al-Assad
rose to power along with a select group of trusted individuals from his family, tribe,
and sect. He then proceeded to create a system whereby the minority Alawites ruled
the country. Despite his use of Pan-Arabism, as a means of uniting the country behind
a Ba’th ideology which advocated equality amongst the sects, he ensured that the
state’s coercive apparatuses remained loyal to the Alawite regime. His son, Bashar
Al-Assad, did not change the system in place and he actually reinforced. Both Hafiz
and Bashar used identity through framing the situation as either an Alawite regime or
a radical Islamist regime, therefore gaining the support of other minorities.
Furthermore, both used favoritism policies enabling a select few Sunnis and other
sects to gain economic privileges even though such a tactic caused resentment within
sects and between the different sects. The Arab Spring has provided an opportunity
for the local identities to be reactivated. Years of political maneuvering have resulted
in a conflict which evolved into a sectarian conflict driven by anger, fear and
resentment. The collapse of the Syrian state has caused a fall of the patronage
networks, thus reinforcing the individual reliance on the local identity for basic
services. This conflict has been further exacerbated through the involvement of
international powers fighting a proxy war as a means of furthering their own interests
through aiding certain groups and thus creating an imbalance in the political scene.
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Chapter 1: Foundations of this Research
1.1 Introduction
Samuel Huntington in his well-known work “Clash of Civilizations” contends
that states with common identities are more likely to lead to cohesive behavior
amongst its citizens. Yet scholars such as Michael Barnett have counter argued that
the Middle East is proof of how even with common identities, identity can be a
driving force of conflict1. The question of identity in the Middle East has deep
historical roots. Since the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of the SykesPicot Agreement, the region was divided in accordance with the political decisions of
the colonial powers which in effect forced people to conform to the groupings of the
established borders. The colonial powers drew the boundaries of the Middle Eastern
states with no consideration to the ethnic groupings which existed at the time. The
colonial powers went about applying policies which reinforced their own political
goals, while at the same time repressing nationalist movements.
The existence of multiple identities, forced into one state can lead to multiple
political conflicts. There are supranational identities and sub-national
identities. Supranational identities are identities that transcend the state borders and
are based on common ties, which resonate with many people to and as such they form
common ties. Such identities can fuel political ideologies such as pan-Arabism and
pan-Islamism. The other kind of identity is sub-national identities, which can be
potentially threatening to the political order. Sub-national identities can threaten the
territorial integrity of a state; for example, the tribal system in countries such as
Yemen and Libya threatens the power of the state. In Syria, the breakout of the civil

1Lynch,

Marc. "Regional International Relations." In The Middle East, edited by Ellen
Lust. CQ Press, 2010.pg, 322.
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war has been underlined by a strong ethnic, sectarian factor which highlighted how
identities can have a strong impact on the way a conflict evolves.
Identity has long been a determinant of political order. Identities can and have
been used as a political tool to suit the position of those in power. The authoritarian
regimes in Egypt from the post Nasser era used identity as a political tool to enhance
regime power and, also, as a source of legitimacy. As such rulers including Nasser
created a pan-Arab, socialist identity in order to gain the support of the people who
were at the time living through very anti-British sentiments. Nasser used the context
of colonialism and constructed an identity which helped him gain support and
legitimacy therefore turning the identity as a unifying tool to enable authoritarian
resilience.
Similarly in Syria, the ruling Arab Socialist Ba’th Party (ASBP), under Hafiz
Al-Assad aimed to help protect the state from demise into ethnic civil war through
unifying the people behind a common pan-Arab identity. In fact, pan-Arabism
acquired an independent formal role in the political scene. Since the Syrian state is
comprised of multiple identities, Hafiz Al-Assad was forced to emphasize a unifying
identity in order to gain the support of the people and to prevent the demise of the
entire state. He later on employed a tactic favoring one ethnic group, the Alawites,
over the others, disrupting the social cohesion of the state.
As such, this thesis makes the key contention that the Arab Spring has given
an opportunity for some of these identities, which were ostracized, to be reactivated,
and in some cases this has threatened the political order by causing inner state
conflict. While recognizing that identity is not the only factor which led to the civil
war, identity and its use is a critical factor to the development of the situation.
Through taking a social constructivist approach, I will examine how identity has been
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a tool for use in Syria. The ramifications of using identity as a political tool will be
assed by examining nationalism and its affects on sectarianism. In Syria, the
differences in identities have had political consequences as many of the Alawite
community and other minorities have chosen to side with the Assad regime, and with
the lack of socioeconomic cohesion in society has caused factions to break off and
lead an armed rebellion against Assad. In Syria, due to loyalty to the sub-national
identities the revolution caused society to fragment and threatened the political order
by further causing fragmentation in the state. Throughout the scope of this identity
will be regarded as a notion which is fluid and ever changing in context to the
political climate at the time. There is no such notion as a “true identity” in the case of
Syria, but identities have been subjected to political use which has helped evolve or
construct these identities in a certain way through their use for the sake of personal
ends.
1.2 Background Information
The events of the Arab Spring took many scholars by surprise as they toppled
what was believed to be the most secure authoritarian regimes. Scholars such as
Micelle Angrist who concluded that “nowhere in the region have opposition
movements successfully built organizations and mobilized ideologically widely
enough, or hit on the ‘right’ tactics to regime change”2. In 2011, a fruit vendor in
Tunisia set himself aflame due to the injustices committed by the police forces. This
set in motion events which would change the political order of the Middle East for the
unforeseeable future. Through the domino effect, a process which works in both
directions, countries within the Middle East continued to influence each other. In
March of the same year, protestors marched in Syria calling for the fall of the Al2Angrist,

Michele Penner. Politics & Society in the Contemporary Middle East.
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010. pg. 464
4

Assad regime. In Syria, the military’s absolute loyalty to the regime caused it to shoot
the protestors. However, in an attempt to control the protesting masses, eventually led
the country on a path to a civil war between regime loyalists and opponents. In turn,
this evolved into a sectarian conflict which effectively brought the Syrian situation to
a stalemate.
1.3 Research Question
This research asks the main question of how has identity been used as a
political tool in Syria under both Hafiz al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad? And what are
the consequences?
1.4 Hypothesis
It is my contention that both Hafiz and Bashar Al-Assad were using identities
in the Syrian context to consolidate and perpetuate the regime’s power. However, in
the process, the politics of identity served to be divisive and precipitated the initial
stages of the civil war.
On an international level, what has fueled this manifestation further is the
Cold War being played out by the international powers who sought to pursue their
own interests through using certain identities. By methods such as funding or
propaganda aimed at framing the civil conflicts in their own favor.
1.5 Methodology
The study of Syria was chosen because it represents a case study which has
different forms of identity. Throughout this research, a literature based approach in
which secondary literature is used in order to draw on the history of how identity was
formed in Syria as well as make analytical observations as to how identity has helped
shape the post Arab Spring political order. A comparative approach is taken to also
look at how the different rulers, namely Hafiz and Bashar Al Assad, framed identity
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in order to further solidify their power and to gain their own interests. This approach
is also applied to look at how different international powers use identity to achieve
their own interests.
1.6 Discourses About Identity in the Middle East
One important characteristic that was evident of the Arab Spring is the
versatile identities that were reactivated from the protests which highlighted the
disparities between the different groups in society. In Syria, identity plays a critical
role in the way political order has been shaped. Authors differ as to the extent of the
effect the Arab Spring has had on these identities, but one cannot argue that these
identities have had a prominent role as a result of the Arab Spring. The notion of
identity being a point of contention is not a novel idea. This research attempts to
analyze the reasons behind why identity has become a point of contention in Syria,
and in the development of the civil war. Identity has been long used as a political tool
in the hands of the regime, through cooptation of certain members of society as well
as coopting the coercive apparatuses, turning them into a tool of the regime through
exclusivity. In this research, identity politics used by both Hafiz and Bashar Al-Assad
led, most importantly, to favoritism, causing resentment and alienation within society.
Factors such as globalization also had an effect on the state’s capacity to provide
patronage to citizens. Moreover, the rapid increase in the population between the eras
of Hafiz and Bashar Al-Assad resulted in a large number of youth unemployment
which eventually took their toll on the state and its patronage structure.
1.6.1: Identity as a Point of Contention
Richard D. Parker in his article “Five Theses on Identity Politics” contends
that identity is part of politics because the field “involves making comparisons and
choices among—and commitments to—values and interests and groups and
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individuals (including choices not to choose among available choices). The choices
and the commitments we make in politics are ones with which we mean to—or by
which we cannot help but—identify ourselves” 3. This is essential because it brings to
attention the importance of associations with making political decisions as well as
ethnic and socioeconomic identification. A link can be made between this analysis
and the role identity plays within the Middle East in terms of political associations as
well as loyalty towards the state. Marc Lynch furthers this notion by reinforcing the
key argument that the scholar Benjamin Miller makes about the contending loyalties
between the state and the nation can lead to violence and instability4. While these
works discuss how identities affect people, they do not discuss how individuals have
different identities which are intertwined and how that affects the individual’s ability
to make political decisions. This analysis can be applied to the study of identity in
Syria, as there are varied ethnic and religious groups who associate themselves with
their local identity, and this can often clash with the regime’s efforts to create a
unified Syrian identity. The concentration on identity eventually led to violence as it
emphasizes the differences as opposed to unifying people. These contending loyalties
are a testament to the fragility of the Syrian state, and gives insight as to why it uses
ideologies such as socialism as a means of unifying people so that citizens focus on
issues other than their ethnic differences.
The issue of identity as a political is not exclusive to the Assad regimes, but in
fact the policies which were set under the French mandate of Syria set the ground
roots for the development of Syrian politics under Hafiz and Bashar Al-Assad. Many
literary works discuss the policies which were in place when France was in control of

3Parker,

Richard D. Five Theses on Identity Politics, 2005.pg. 55
Marc, “Regional International Relations” The Middle East. Edited by Ellen
Lust. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2011.pg. 322
4Lynch,
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Syria. An essential precursor to this is the Sykes Picot Agreement which placed Syria
in the hands of the French. While the borders which were drawn in the Sykes Picot
agreement are different than the modern day borders of Syria, modern day Syria was
under the sphere of influence of France. Marina Ottaway commented on the
importance of the Sykes Picot Agreement in playing a role in the eventual conflicts in
identity which exist today across the entire region. In her words, “the borders that
were eventually established bear almost no resemblance to the lines drawn—in
exquisite imperial fashion—by the two diplomats whose main concern was to decide
how Britain and France would divide among themselves the Arab parts of the
Ottoman Empire” 5. It is important to note that all states are inherently artificial since
all borders are a man-made concept. A criticism that is often dealt towards the Sykes
Picot Agreement is that the lines were drawn without any reflection to the ethnic
make up of the entire region. This can be seen in the case of the Kurdish people in the
region as they are separated across Syria, Iraq and Turkey. This resulted in the
formation of states with multiple identities, which is relevant to some of the internal
conflicts which occur within countries of the Middle East. This point is furthered by
Beverly Milton Edwards and Peter Hinchcliffe in their book “Conflicts in the Middle
East Since 1945” who argue that “the arbitrary nature of state creation following the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of regimes striving to consolidate
and maintain their authority within highly artificial borders has forced issues of ethnic
identity underground without eradicating them”6. In states with multiple ethnic
identities the result is a state with multiple nations. Benjamin Miller argues that the
contestation between the “nation” and the “state” is “the most important driving force
5Ottoway,

Marina. "Learning from Sykes-Picot." The Wilson Center. November 19,
2015. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/learning-sykes-picot.
6Milton-Edwards, Beverley, and Peter Hinchcliffe. Conflicts in the Middle East since
1945. London: Routledge, 2001. pg. 74.
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behind the conflict and instability in the Middle East”7. While such authors give credit
to the Sykes Picot Agreement other authors disagree with this assessment. Authors
such as Sara Pursley, make the argument that the current borders of the Middle East
bear no resemblance to the ones drawn in the actual agreement. While many authors
who credit this agreement for the bases of many of the ethnic conflict which is
occurring today in the Middle East, they fail to discuss an alternative to this
agreement. In the scope of this research, the area, which was designated as “Syria” in
which the French began employing policies, will be used as a bases of analysis.
The literature on identity politics points towards that identity continues to play
a key role in the way politics is structured and organized. After the wave of
emancipation from the colonial powers, states began to enforce state identities in
order to ensure state stability; Samuel Helot in his article “Post-Colonial States and
the Struggle for Identity in the Middle East since World War Two” argues that “not
only authoritarian states, but rather nation states in general have had to impose
themselves on their societies” 8. This helps link between the colonial aftermath and
helping understand how these identities were further reinforced through the state. This
can be best seen in the case study of Syria, as Hoff and Simon point out the ethnic and
religious breakdown of Syria is very diverse. Ethnically, about 90% of Syrians are
Arabs and 9% are Kurds, with the remaining 1% comprising Assyrians, Armenians,
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Lynch, Marc, “Regional International Relations” The Middle East. Edited by Ellen
Lust. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2011.pg. 325
8Helfront, Simon. "Post-Colonial States and the Struggle for Identity in the Middle
East since World War Two." Foreign Policy Research Institute. October 2015.
https://www.fpri.org/articles/2015/10/post-colonial-states-and-struggle-identitymiddle-east-world-war-two.
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Circassians, and Turkmen. Religiously the breakdown is even more diverse with
Sunni, Shia, Alawites, Greek Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox and Druze9.
1.6.2: Authoritarian Resilience and Sectarianism in Syria
Sectarianism is an essential tool for authoritarian regimes to maintain power.
Authoritarian regimes such as Syria under both Hafiz and Bashar Al-Assad would be
considered ideologically weak. Many of their policies are based on patronage as
opposed to mass scale development and social cohesion, therefore they rely on
sectarianism and identity politics in order to consolidate their own power and ensure
the resilience of their own regime.
Joshua Stacher discusses the use of identity in Syria heavily in the book
Adaptable Autocrats. According to the author, the state was forced to “create” an
identity in order to prevent the state from demising into civil war. He makes the
contention that Hafiz Al-Assad further empowered the pan-Arab identity and
solidified it through the Baath Party in order to unify the state, “without a
consolidated national identity, political elites continued to pay tribute to pan-Arabism
as a means of holding their weak state and heterogeneous society together” 10. As
such, Stacher connects this tactic to a form of authoritarian resilience. When a state is
fragile due to the multiple ethnic identities the authoritarian regime must find a
unifying factor, “the absence of a functional state and regional cleavages left Arab
nationalism as the only unifying identity to bind and organize Syria’s then fractious
polity” 11.
In addition, Stacher furthers his argument by making comparisons as to how
9Hof,

Frederic C., and Alex Simon. "Alex Simon. "Sectarian Violence in Syria’s Civil
War." The Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial
Museum. pg. 4
10Stacher, Joshua. Adaptable Autocrats: Regime Power in Egypt and Syria. Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2012. pg 22.
11 Ibid., pg. 77
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identity can be further used as a political tool by the state in order to maintain their
authority
“Citizens’ ideas of what… “Syria” [is], as [a] nation, helped determine which
state-builder constructed a system with centralized executive authority while the
other settled for decentralized executive authority. National identity, therefore,
contributed to the establishment of … Syria’s varying political orders by granting
or precluding the leader’s autonomy from the state’s institutions” 12.
Domestic policies were also essential in the politics of identity in Syria. Under
Hafiz Al-Assad, scholars such as Lisa Wadeen discuss tactics that Hafiz Al-Assad
used in order to unify the people behind a common Syrian identity. Some of these
tactics include, using strong nationalistic language in order to incite people to regard
themselves as Syrian citizens. As the author points out “in countries such as Syria, the
particular problems faced by successive regimes stem largely from this incongruity
between felt membership and state authority, between "national" identification and
political organization13”. By the end of his era, it could be argued that Hafiz Al-Assad
was capable of forging near social cohesion through policies such as socialism which
helped people set aside their differences in favor of a common Syrian identity. Lisa
Wadeen while discussing how through these tools helped develop an ultra
nationalistic mentality which was formed in order maintain the power of Hafiz AlAssad, does not discuss how different, more radical groups such as the Kurdish
people were able to maintain their own identity and even have it develop to the extent
that some groups later on would call for autonomy.
Existing literature points towards a clash in policies that were applied by both

Ibid., pg. 48
Lisa. Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in
Contemporary Syria. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.pg, 16
12

13Wedeen,
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Hafiz Al-Assad and Bashar Al- Assad. Despite using policies aimed at unifying
Syrians, Hafiz Al-Assad employed sectarian policies which undermined them and
they were enforced by Bashar Al-Assad. In order to gain more support within the
country, authors such as Salwa Ismail argue that through forging economic ties with
selected members of the Sunni sect, Hafiz Al-Assad was able to ensure that he had
some support in some of the sects14. This causes the rise of crony capitalism, whereby
unorthodox economic practices of regime such as favoritism of certain members
caused the rise of an elite who were coopted by the regime in order to extend their
support bases within the Sunni sect. Under Bashar Al Assad, the liberalization efforts
and the networks he set up in order to ensure support only resulted in further
disparities in society as it led to corruption and bred a new elite that had an interest in
maintaining the status quo thus highlighting the importance of crony capitalism within
the regime15.
Furthermore, research shows that the exclusiveness of the military helped
create resentment between the different sects in Syria. Authors such as Barry Rubin
content that this exclusiveness was essential as the regimes of both Hafiz and Bashar
set up several ways to ensure their survival the most important being making sure a
large number of Alawites are tied to the government and managing the armed forces.
This exclusivity is essential because of a minority complex on behalf of the regime
whereby any attacks against the regime are perceived as an attack on the minority,
thus warranting mass violence. In both regimes, the army was treated as arm of the
regime, that will do its bidding. These works are excellent in discussing how coercive

14Ismail,

Salwa. "Changing Social Structure, Shifting Alliances and Authoritarianism
in Syria." In Demystifying Syria, by Fred Haley Lawson. London: Saqi in Association
with the London Middle East Institute, 2009.pg, 50
15Haddad, Bassam. Business Networks in Syria: The Political Economy of
Authoritarian Resilience. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012.pg, 171
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apparatus that are kept exclusive are an essential factor in order to maintain the
strength of the regime. Since the regime would not be maintained through democratic
means, they must rely on brute force in order to stay in power and therefore they must
ensure the loyalty of the military. Furthermore, while these works discuss these tactics
they do not discuss how outside factors can affect the regime. For example, the affect
of issues such as globalization as well as the possible drawbacks of a regime relying
so heavily on sectarian politics, are not discussed.
In the era of Bashar Al-Assad, scholars argue that despite being regarded as a
reformer, Bashar Al-Assad did not change many of the sectarian policies which were
employed by his father. Scholars such as Eyal Zisser describe the presidency of
Bashar as greatly reliant on the system which was set up by his father, a one-man
system that was dependent on the military for power. The book by Zisser took a more
autobiographical approach to analyzing politics, which helped give insight into the
way in which Bashar took decisions. Yet, still it does not mention the drawbacks of
such identity politics. The drawbacks of such an approach towards politics and the use
of identity politics will be elaborated on in this research.
Bashar Al-Assad stressed the importance of the Syrian identity (unifying
factor) and at the same time used the grand rhetoric of the Arab identity which helped
people unite even further. Through looking at the works of these scholars a trend
appears whereby identity politics are employed as a means to ensure regime survival,
but through the use of these policies, the regime in the last decade of Bashar AlAssad’s rule appeared to be unraveling, eventually precipitating civil war and causing
local identities to be reactivated.
Identity politics is seen as playing a critical role in Syrian politics, as it helped
unify the different ethnicities under the common banner of Syrian nationalism and
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Pan-Arabism. This helped Hafiz and Bashar maintain their system, as through
unifying the people, Syrians would no longer focus on issues such as the exclusivity
of the military and the under-representation of the other ethnic groups/sects in the
political system. And instead view both father and son as Syrians ruling the Syrian
people. Through these tactics, identity politics became a tool to ensure the
maintenance of their power.
1.6.3: The Ramifications of Identity Politics
The missing link in the literature deals with how the use identity politics,
which was aimed at maintaining the Assad regime, eventually became no longer
viable and took their tool on the state. This research bridges tactics and factors in
other forces such as globalization and internal factors such as unemployment and how
they’ve had a drastic effect on the state. Under Hafiz Al-Assad the main social
contract between the people and the state was that the state would provide economic
privileges to the people and they would become politically obedient. This was
successful under Hafiz Al-Assad, but the increase in population, and youth
unemployment meant the state’s capacity to provide patronage weakened and
eventually took its toll on the state. This factors only served to weaken the state’s
legitimacy and as a result, the ramifications of identity politics began to surface, and
the Arab Spring became to determining factor in the reactivation of local identities.
Furthermore, more contemporary literature does not adequately link past
tactics used by both Assads to the current crisis. The Arab Spring gave an opportunity
for some identities to be reactivated. With the weakening of authoritarianism, in
combination with the favoritism policies towards a certain group which prevented the
economic cohesion of the society, these local level identities were given the
opportunity to re-emerge. The building of identities “represents a powerful means for
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national elites to unite citizens within a territorially-bound political community and to
win consent for their political leadership. The discourse of nationalism is constituted
through the construction of an identity and culture that is exclusive and different from
those of other nations”16. Furthermore, in Syria, the use of identity as argued by Pratt
can be seen as a political tool for the elite to gain support of the people.
While the initial phase of the protests was calling for human rights, the
situation quickly deteriorated into ethnic conflict. Further to the ways in which
identity can be used as a political tool, Fearon and Latin in their article “Violence and
the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity” argue that the use of ethnicity by political
elite is the key aspect when analyzing the causes for ethnic violence. They argue that
through “differentiating one’s self or one’s group from an Other, and that therefore
identity construction necessarily entails the potential for a violent, antagonistic
relationship with the Other”17. This is essentially the use of the “we/they mentality”,
in which people begin formulating their own identities and distinguishing themselves
from other groups in society, this can create the notion as Hale explains of in-group
favoritism.
In Syria this occurs through the favoritism of the Alawites which caused the
in-group tensions within the Syrian society. Moreover, this is a tactic used by the
regime to distinguish between the “moderate” Syrians vs. “radical” groups such as the
Islamists. Fearon and Latin also argue that the political elite use ethnic violence “to
hold or acquire power” 18. This argument would be agreed upon by Roger Petersen
who elaborates in his book that the political elite play an important role in ethnic

16Pratt,

Nicola. "Identity, Culture and Democratization: The Case of Egypt." New
Political Science 27, no. 1 (2005). pg. 80
17Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. "Violence and the Social Construction of
Ethnic Identity." International Organization 54, no. 4 (2000).pg, 851
18 Ibid,. pg, 853
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violence by “inflame[ing] and intensif[ying] the emotions”19. The use of emotions is
very important in ethnic conflict as the leader will need to advocate a certain ideology
and may have to appeal to the public to justify their actions.
In Syria, the use of identity politics in the authoritarian system is seen to have
caused ethnic conflict and eventually civil war. It is important to note that identity is
not the only factor which lead to civil war, but is arguably one of the most important
when trying to analyze the current events in Syria. The Syrian civil war is a product of
years of identity politics which eventually took their toll on the state. Stathis N.
Kalyvas argues that “civil wars are not binary conflicts but complex and ambiguous
processes that foster an apparently massive, though variable, mix of identities and
actions—to such a degree as to be defined by that mix”20. There is varying literature
about the role identity plays in violence with some scholars such as Roger Petersen
who argue that it is an important issue. Others such as Fearon and Latin in their article
“Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War” point out that while it may be an important
reason, it is not the main reason. This book, while discussing ethnic conflict in Europe
discusses a key issue when looking at civil wars, which is the power of emotions in
causing these conflicts. The argument of the book can be extended further to show the
reasons behind the civil war in Syria. The three main emotions discussed are fear,
hatred resentment. Through studying the Syrian case study, this literature can be
applied as it can be argued that the identity politics that were used by the Assads, both
father and son, to stay in power caused resentment, fear and hatred that compounded
into ethnic conflict. The only difficulty within this point of view is the idea of
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quantifying abstract notions such as emotions. Nevertheless, the key argument in this
book can help shed light on the current events in Syria and fill the gap of what
happened when sectarianism and sectarian politics take their toll on authoritarian
regimes.
One important issue within studying civil wars which is missing from the
previous literature is the method by which authoritarian systems involve more citizens
in the civil war to fight for the regime. In Syria, as the civil war escalated, the regime
use of sectarian paramilitary forces to cause more fear within people. This is a method
by which authoritarian systems can use sectarianism as a tool. Petersen addressed this
question by taking an emotion-based approach, arguing that fear, hatred and
resentment will cause people of an ethnic group to lash out against the other. This
argument would be rejected by Fearon and Latin who argue that such a conclusion
would be too quick. In their other article, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”
Fearon and Latin argue that ethnicity does play a role in civil wars, but it is not the
main reason. In Syria, Alawite paramilitary forces fight on behalf of the regime in
order to protect the “current way of life” which is regarded as in the “Syrian way of
life” and will lash out against anyone who tries to change that. They argue “the root
cause of these civil wars is seen as the nationalism of culturally distinct ethnic
minorities who rebel either because they harbor grievances arising from
discrimination by ethnic majorities… or cultural incompatibilities and nationalist
aspirations” 21. They argue that these conditions that favor grievances lead to
insurgency. The idea that grievances play an essential role in Syria is applicable, as
grievances caused by the unequal treatment between the different minorities in Syria
was one of the main factors that lead to the uprising.
21Fearon,
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1.6.4: Demise of the Patron Client Relationship
The patron-client relationship which was first instilled by Hafiz Al-Assad
began deteriorating in the years of Bashar Al-Assad, but what is interesting is that the
failure to provide services is a never ending cycle, as the with the continuation of the
conflict the state cannot provide basic services and this causes a further demise of the
state into ethnic and sectarian lines. The Iraqi case represents a very interesting
example as it also represents a state whereby a ruler, Sadam Hussein, practiced
identity politics. After his ouster by the US led intervention, sectarian conflict
engulfed the state. Many of the articles written about Iraq can be also applied to Syria
to demonstrate how the use of sectarianism in politics can have detrimental effects on
the aftermath of the state. Multiple identities become a political problem and
eventually lead to violence as a result of the maneuvering of identities for political
interests. Author Faleh A. Jabar discusses how the Sadam Hussein regime used the
tribal identities of Iraq in its favor in order to gain more regime loyalists. This analysis
can be further applied to the Syrian case study. According to Jabar in state weakness
the state will use identities in order for them to act as extensions of the state. This can
be arguably applied to the Syrian case study whereby Hafiz Al-Assad, in the
weakness of the Syrian state, used the Alawite identity in order to surround himself by
loyalists to further solidify the power of the state. Furthermore, he makes the key
argument that the need for kinship grows as the state ability to provide welfare, an
argument which is applicable in the Syrian case study within the final years of Bashar
Al-Assad where factors such as globalization created socioeconomic problems,
eventually taking their toll on the regime. Furthermore, this can describe the system
within the civil war in which the need for kinship continues to grow. This gives rise to
a question of with the extent of the demise of the Syrian state, will this need for
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kinship ever be reversed. This article highlights how authoritarian regimes can play a
factor in the use of identity which can exacerbate political violence. But it is
important to point out that there is no way to know if the development of the Iraqi
case would have been different had the US never intervened.
1.6.5 Identity Politics and State Failure
Amongst the literature which can be used as indicators to what occurs when
sectarian politics fail in authoritarian regimes and their consequences, is the study of
state collapse. One of the key consequences of years of identity politics practiced in
Syria is state failure. In Syria, this study takes the position that Syria is a failed state
as it has lost its ability to provide basic goods and services. One common point of
analysis between scholars Fearon, Latin, Kalyvas, Hale, and Petersen is that a
precursor to the violence is some level of state collapse that results in mass violence.
This is a valid point, because in order for this large-scale level of violence to occur,
the state has to have lost control of the state apparatus and the ability to carry out its
duty to protect citizens. This reverts back to the notion of legitimacy, as the Syrian
civil war escalated and the state could no longer protect citizens, paramilitary forces
which are based on sectarianism arose. The state lost its ability to provide basic
services, thus losing its legitimacy in the eyes of the people. This highlights the
ramifications of years of reliance on sectarianism on behalf of the Syrian regimes. As
the civil war escalated, violence caused people to rely on their own exclusive
sectarian groups thus further cementing the new social structure and undermining the
work of Hafiz Al-Assad at creating a near cohesive state. Furthermore, the presence
of sectarian paramilitary forces is an indication that the state has lost its ability to
monopolize the use of force, further losing its legitimacy in the eyes of the people.
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1.6.6: International Dimension and Conflict Exacerbation
Another important aspect that needs to be discussed when observing identity and
politics is the role that international and regional powers play within the context of
developing these identities and exacerbating the conflict. Looking into how
international factors help use identity to further their own interests, effectively
creating a proxy war is very important. Actors such as the Gulf, Iran, Russia, and the
US need to be considered as they have a direct control over how some identities are
empowered. Toby Matthiesen, in his article “The Gulf vs. The Arab Spring” by
argues that the issue of foreign funding of certain sects in countries such as Syria has
brought about the “breakdown of the cross-sectarian social fabric in the Gulf and
beyond” 22. This would explain why when the Shi’a majority in Bahrain started
protesting, the Gulf provided the resources to quell the protests. This avenue of
research is important to analyze because identities do not develop in a vacuum, they
evolve in accordance with other factors and are enabled accordingly.
The study of identity is essential when analyzing the events of the Arab
Spring, this research argues that the Arab Spring gave an opportunity for local
identities to be brought into the forefront. One key aspect of this topic that needs to be
addressed is the fact that the Arab Spring is a very new phenomenon and the true
effects it has on these identities will be observed decades later. There is somewhat of
a gap in the research in linking how identity politics in Syria throughout the different
eras from the French mandate until Bashar Al-Assad have a direct effect in the way
the events unfolded and their breakdown into a sectarian conflict. This research
analyzes literature which was written before the current events in order to show how
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identity was used under the authoritarian regimes of Hafiz Al-Assad and Bashar AlAssad as a means to stay in power, yet eventually they take their toll on the regimes
causing the initial stages of the civil war.
1.7 Theoretical Framework
This research uses a social constructivist approach when analyzing politics.
The merit of using such an approach stems from the fact that there is an emphasis on
identities and the way they shape regional politics and dynamics within the Middle
East, which is essential when looking into how identity is manifested. Marc Lynch
discuses why the social constructivist approach is beneficial when analyzing identity
in the Middle East. As he puts it, the Middle East, is a “region defined by a shared
language, political culture, and institutions” 23. On this basis, renowned social
constructivist Michael Barnett discusses the importance of identity in the analysis of
the Middle East as “Arab states fought about defining the norms that should govern
their relations; social processes, not social structures”24.
The main focus of this research is analyzing the role identity plays in
determining political order therefore it is critical to establish what is meant by the
word identity. In the field of political science there is no accepted definition of the
word identity. Scholar James D. Fearon argues that the “present idea of ‘identity’ is a
fairly recent social construct, and a rather complicated one at that. Even though [the
phrase is commonly used in] everyday discourse, it proves quite difficult to give a
short and adequate summary statement that captures the range of its present
meanings” 25. This represents the difficulty in establishing a set definition of a phrase
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which is based on social norms and is very abstract. Jenkins attempts to define the
phrase by establishing that it “refers to the ways in which individuals and
collectivities are distinguished in their social relations with other individuals and
collectivities” 26.
According to Fearon identity can be simply defined as the answer to the
question of, “who am I?” In another work with scholar David D. Latin they propose,
that identity includes “rules of membership that decide who is and is not a member of
the category; and content, that is, sets of characteristics (such as beliefs, desires, moral
commitments, and physical attributes) thought to be typical of members of the
category, or behaviors expected or obliged of members in a certain situation” 27.
Henry E. Hale, simply puts it, identity is “a kind of social radar” 28.
This study uses aspects of both definitions. Identity, in the scope of this
research, is considered as the norms and values that are shared amongst a group of
people who consider themselves distinctive from other groups, creating a sense of
exclusivity. This allows that social entities be grouped into blocs that can be analyzed
in Syria.
Another important consideration to bear in mind when looking into identity
within politics is the different schools of thought that take part in the debate of what is
identity that are the constructivist and the primordial schools of thought. Henry Hale
critiques both schools by arguing that they “reduce [identity] to gross
oversimplifications” 29. This is true to some extent as both schools of thought make
generalizations regarding a topic as complicated as identity, but despite this
26Jenkins,
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observation these schools of thought do make key analysis which makes identity more
clear. The first school is the primordial school of thought. This school of thought,
according to Hale, believes that identity is constant. He likens their view on identity to
a “stone wall” by which the different ethnic groups in the world constitute a “wall” in
society, “each group has its particular constitutive features (cultures, traditions,
histories, physical traits, language repertoires, religion, etc.)”30. Fearon and Latin
argue that this school of thought argues, “mistakenly, that certain social categories are
natural, inevitable, and unchanging facts about the social world” 31. There is one
inconsistency in Hale’s explanation of premordialism. In his work he explains that
these features, “do not change”, yet this contradicts with a later argument in which he
explains that the proponents of this school of thought “do not argue that the subjects
of their studies are eternal… but once formed, groups tend to strongly endure”32. This
is a contradiction within the explanation, but more importantly, this definition, which
is largely based on primordialist Van Evara’s definition, shows how the school of
thought does not take into account important issues such as globalization and the fact
that identities today are not clear-cut. Hale also highlights that the school of thought
relies on the key issue of perception of the individual of the group around them, which
can be interpreted as a flaw of the primordial school of thought as people’s
perceptions of identities can cause splinters from within identities themselves as
differences in practice can be argued as based on perception of a certain ethnicity and
its practices.
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This study focuses primarily on the second school of thought which is the
constructivist school of thought that debates the issue of identity is constructivism.
This school of thought according to Fearon and Latin argues, “identities are socially
constructed”33. This school of thought believes that over time identity has changed
and is in fact “fluid and endogenous to human action” 34. This school of thought
regards the wall that is described by the primordialists as simply a façade and that the
defining feature of identity is the fact that boundaries are created and persist35. Some
proponents of this school of thought would argue that once an identity is formed, they
generally endure; yet still with modernization, people’s identity can ultimately
change. This school of thought can be argued as more plausible, because it takes into
consideration the important issue of globalization and how identities evolve over time
with the freedom of movement. It also takes into consideration the modernization
theory which argues that as people and society modernize they move away from
notions such as culture36.
These approaches are best to describe the different kinds of identity within
Syria as they look at identity as a fluid notion, socially constructed, which can help set
parameters making it possible to analyze how identity has been used as a political tool
in Syria.
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Chapter 2: Identity and the Study of Political Science
The study of identity in the Middle East is an important element to
understanding the events unfolding in Syria. Recently studies have shown that identity
has become more important than mere biological decent or class37. Studying identity
as a factor in politics is the study of not only the formation of bonds between
individuals within a community but also how these different communities interact
with each other. Identity must be emphasized due to multiple reasons the most
important being the fact that the identity of an individual is an important factor in
shaping their cognitive thought and therefore has an effect on the way they make
political decisions.
2.1: The importance of Identity in Politics
Amongst the most important theorists who argued in favor of identity being a
consideration in the political decisions of an individual is Max Weber. He saw
identity as a human groups who entertained the notion that they are bound by certain
characteristics and what bonded them together was their subjective perception of
these bonds and what these bonds entailed38. The importance of identity in political
action is the notion of the perception of these characteristics. The way a person sees
themselves has a direct impact on their decisions as it can often translate to a group
perception thus creating a “we vs. they” mentality which fuels action within an entire
community. Furthermore, Weber specified that the what facilitates these bonds within
a group formation is the political community. Therefore this translation of a bond on a
group level creates a form of solidarity between members, which can create a political
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community.
There are several reasons why studying identity is essential for the field of
political science. The power a sense of identity holds on an individual is not to be
underestimated. This sense of identity helps the individual “provide a definition, an
interpretation of the self that establishes what and where the person is on both social
and psychological terms”39. This helps the individual instil a sense of order within
their lives through helping them place themselves within a larger social structure. This
further reinforces the idea of solidarity within the group highlighting that they share a
bond as well as a common fate therefore maintaining an interest in the future. The
individual’s identity then becomes a driving force in their ability to make decisions.
2.2: State Construction of Identity
The construction of identities can occur in several ways. It is important to
point out that some identities are symbolically constructed and predicated on the
notion of that there exists characteristics which place differences between one group
and the rest. In states, identities can be predicated on the existence of borders which
helps separate one group from the rest. Yet the case becomes different when there are
competing local identities, in which the state must find a unifying symbol that appeals
to the groups in order to establish the sense of solidarity. States also have a very
important role in constructing identities. In countries where there are multiple local
identities the state will have to impose its authority through constructing a unified
state identity. The state will employ different tools in order to help construct the
identity of its citizens. Amongst these tools are emphasizing the minimal differences
between the population in order to help enforce the grouping tools which help unite
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people40. Emphasizing such differences helps appeal to a wider range of people as
well as instilling a sense of belonging between the different groups therefore giving
them more cause to be part of the state enforced identity. While people may have
multiple identities stemming from different roots, the state must find a way to connect
between people to ensure that they set aside differences and bond through the
common similarities with which to unify people for group action.
A state will use rhetoric in order to frame the society as a cohesive one
essentially uniting people against the “other”. The idea of “othering” is an important
political tool that is used by political leaders in order to establish a separate identity of
one group from the rest. Often this will be build upon rhetoric which demonizes the
other group essentially giving the group a common goal.
Sune Qvotrup Jensen notes that identities are “always situated within specific
social contexts and conditioned by them”41. This speaks to the idea that identities are
often used as a political tool by the state in order to derive a certain reaction. The use
of “othering” can be a means to such an end. He makes a further observation that this
tool is explored by political thinkers such as Hegel and his theory of the self and
other42. The reasoning behind such a connection is that Hegel through his work makes
the distinction between the individual and the other as two separate entities with their
own characteristics. Essentially, the way one entity is defined is through juxtaposing it
from the self43. Furthermore, “othering” as a tool combines many of the
aforementioned tactics in order to unify the people then further establish them as an
entirely separate group from the rest. This ties into the argument of Weber who
40Wedeen,

Lisa. Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in
Contemporary Syria. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.pg, 32
41Jensen, Sune Qvotrup. "Othering, Identity Formation and Agency." Qualitative
Studies 2 (2011).pg, 63
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
27

contends that these characteristics, which set one group separate from the rest, must
be subjectively perceived. The state can play a role in the way these messages are
framed through the use of tools such as symbols, shared political memories, and
nationalistic rhetoric in order to help construct the identity, and further enforce it
through the use of “othering” in order to set one group distinct from the self.
Edward Said gave an example of “othering” on a more international level
using the case of the West and the Orient. The West was able to distinguish itself
from the Orient through applying basic reductionist tools44. The use of reductionist
tools such as stereotyping helps make the categorizations more memorable thus more
probable that they will stay for long periods of time. The West would apply such
reductionist tools which subsequently resulted in the categorization of the Orient as an
alien being “as alien and to incorporate it schematically on a theatrical stage whose
audience, managers and actors are for Europe, and only for Europe.”45
Scholars such as Anthony D. Smith highlight rhetoric based tools which help
establish a common identity employed by the state. He highlights the power in
creating symbols in order to give people a sense of pride within being part of a certain
group. Further tools include how political leaders will often highlight a common
descent amongst a group which helps give an impression of unity amongst the
different factions of a society. This tool is especially important as it highlights the
notion of continuity with the past tying together nationalism and identity46.
Furthermore, states will appeal to common political memories such as revolutions or
wars in order to help give a sense of need for group action or even in times of social
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distress to create social cohesion. This becomes especially when advocating for group
political action as it causes people to set aside differences and focus on commonalities
which inflame a sense of nationalism. Also political leaders will often resort to
appealing to the memories of an extinct political community in order to highlight the
success and unity of the past in order to gain support for a common future further
galvanizing group action47.
Further to the rhetoric used by the state in order to construct identity, rulers
will often use general linguistic tools such referring to the group as “the people”48.
Such tools are intended to be very general as they help place people under a unifying
heading. Such terms denote common identities between varying groups as well as
invoking a sense of belonging to the state or nation. Furthermore, these tools are
helping because according to Weber, no matter how loosely the groups are related,
they are capable of uniting people because they imply the existence of a contemporary
political community.
The ability of the state to help achieve this sense of unified identity through
tools of construction speaks to the power to which a state holds. Any state needs to
establish a common identity in order to enforce its power over its subjects. As Nazih
N. Ayubi discusses, the state has a moral personality which is to oversee the affairs of
the people in a specific territory with the rules of sovereignty in mind49. Therefore if a
state is able to maintain its power, it must find a way to unify people otherwise there
will be breakouts of violence due to a lack of social cohesion. Thus calling for the
need to construct identities in the state in order to prevent the breakout of violence
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that can be based upon identity. In the article, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”
Fearon and Latin argue that while ethnicity plays a role in civil wars lead by ethnic
minorities, it is not the main reason. Scholars such as Fearon and Latin point out that
“the root cause of these civil wars is seen as the nationalism of culturally distinct
ethnic minorities who rebel either because they harbor grievances arising from
discrimination by ethnic majorities… or cultural incompatibilities and nationalist
aspirations”50. Social cohesion is an essential factor to prevent civil wars, and as such
states with a heterogeneous identities are often forced to use tools in order to
emphasize the commonalities between the different people as well as to ensure that
minorities feel like they belong, as part of a larger community otherwise they will
descend into being more loyal towards their local identities.
The state’s exercise of influence when it comes to identity construction is a
factor in Ayubi’s view of its ability to exercise power. According to Ayubi, the states
power is rooted in three structural dimensions with the means of persuasion being the
third structural component51. This entails the ability of a state to enforce an ideology
as well as influence the identity and culture. A state and a political ruler ensures the
stability of the country and its ability to be powerful through enforcing the means
necessary to convince the people to set aside differences and adhere to one common
identity that resonates with as many people as possible. Unifying identities also
becomes very important especially in times of crisis where the state will appeal to the
nationalist sentiment in people which can cause the rise of anger against those who
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threaten the traditional or accepted lifestyle and identity52. In order to gain more
support, some leaders will often use the “othering” technique against citizens from
within their own country in order to help maintain the status quo. Yet this becomes
very dangerous because this can lead to ethnic violence such as genocide.
Often these contending identities can become a point of abuse for political
elite in the pursuit of their own interest. Fearon and Latin in their article “Violence
and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity” argue that the use of ethnicity by
political elite is the key aspect when analyzing the causes for ethnic violence. They
discuss the idea of “othering” as an important tool in the process to frame a group as
an enemy thus unifying people against them, “differentiating one’s self or one’s group
from an Other, and that therefore identity construction necessarily entails the potential
for a violent, antagonistic relationship with the Other”53. This is essentially the use of
the “we/they mentality”, in which people begin formulating their own identities thus
creating the notion of of in-group favoritism.
Identity construction is a process which takes time and is constantly evolving
and changing in accordance to the political times which the state goes through. As
Weber contends, the original motives which drive the creation of these identities are
forgotten over time and they become accepted as customs and the convention54. But
no matter the efforts that the state employs in order to unify the identity of its people,
identities can often remain latent and will suddenly reemerge with unexpected force
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as a consequence of ideological vacuums55.
2.3: Identity Construction, Politics in the Middle East
Identity plays an integral factor in shaping the cognition of individuals in the
Middle East. People in the Middle East often are members of multiple identity groups
which can be transnational such as the Islamic identity as well as members of local
identities such as members of a certain tribe from a certain district. The Middle East
as a region is defined “by a shared language, political culture, and institutions” 56. Yet
despite these factors which unify people, there are many competing identities which
often create a point of contention as they sometimes challenge the territorial integrity
of the state when they call for separatism. Political elites will then use tools such as
“othering” in order to frame these groups as unpatriotic, even further categorizing
them as terrorists. Such is the case with the Kurds in Turkey.
Scholar David Siddhartha Patel gives an example when demonstrating the
different identities with an individual who lives in the Middle East. Abbas is a
member of the middle class in Iraq. He subscribes to the religion of Islam, specifically
Shi’ism. He is from the Banu Tamim tribe in the district of Busra57. These factors of
his identity are essential and can be defining factors when making political decisions
as an individual. Patel further goes on to explain that during elections, political parties
often tell him to think of himself as first and foremost as an Iraqi and to not look into
factionalist demands58. Here it is evident that political parties will adhere to the
enforced identity as a form of ensuring continuation of political power and to avoid
55Guibernau,
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the individual interests from dividing the state. Abbas’ local mosque tells him that he
is a member of an Islamic umma which is indicative of the transnational identity
which can also threaten the integrity of the state as it can be controlled by outside
factors such as the case with Nasser and Pan-Arabism. Abbas is also a member of the
Banu Tamim tribe, which is a more local identity. The tribal identity is an essential
one in the Middle East, as often tribes can become important political actors, with
members supporting a certain candidate in elections. Moreover, a ruler can favor his
own tribe thus beginning the favoritism policies which leads to disparities within the
society, disrupting social cohesion and ultimately violence. The example of Abbas is a
representation of the different identities which can exist in an individual. Often what
each identity calls for can be conflicting, but individuals find a way to avoid internal
conflict. The aforementioned characteristics are often shared with some individuals
but not others; this can create groups within the countries, causing the formation of
communities based on their shared characteristics59. These characteristics become
very important as they can become determinants when he makes his political
decisions. One important issue is that through this it becomes apparent that identities
are not fixed and will interact with other identities, both local and international thus
shaping the way they evolve. One such example is Shi’ism and the grand Ayatollah of
Iran, here an identity was shaped into a political one with many members from
different countries. These identities are also subject to change through many factors
such as evolution and personal choice.
Identity politics is something that is done within the authoritarian systems of
the Middle East as a form of sustaining these authoritarian regimes. Faleh A. Jabar
discusses how states will construct and maneuver identities in order to ensure the
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sustainability of the regime and the state60. They will use shared political memories
such as successful wars fought and revolutions to unite people and have them act a
certain way. Furthermore they will construct separate groups through “othering” when
one group poses a threat to either the regime or the territorial integrity of the state.
Jabar furthers his argument by highlighting how weak states will use identities and
have them act as extensions of the state 61. Furthermore, he makes the key argument
that the need for kinship grows as the state becomes unable to provide welfare. The
use and abuse of identities is a very delicate process and when not handled properly
can cause the latent identities when they reemerge to do so with violence.
This chapter sought to discuss why the study of identity is integral to the study
of political science in general and why it is essential to the study of the Middle East.
Identities, within the scope of this study are constructed; they are ever evolving and
are dependent on entities such as states. Identities have long been a tool for political
use, for example in Syria, Hafiz Al-Assad used the Pan-Arab identity as a unifying
factor between the different sects in Syria in order to avoid the demise of the state into
a ethnic conflict and to help unite the Syrian people.
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Chapter 3: Colonialism and the Construction of Syrian Identity
The first part of this chapter examines the roots of existing social structure,
which will be analyzed later on in this research, which were heavily built upon the
sociopolitical structure which was initially set up by the French colonial power. This
left behind a legacy of ethnic fragmentation which would affect Syrian governments
until this very day. The second part of this chapter analyzes the political system which
was established since Syria achieved independence from the French colonial power
and the consequences of colonialism on the establishment of a political system
sectarian in nature. Furthermore, how the political powers that took control continued
to maintain this system, even using the identity crisis and constructing a state identity
to ensure the maintenance of Hafez Al-Assad’s regime.
3.1: Colonial Policies in Syria
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire colonial powers began pursuing
their own interests within the region. Under the Ottoman Empire, France was
considered a trading partner therefore it began setting up its own economic interests
from very early on62. Therefore, after the fall of the Ottomans, it claimed “historic
rights” to the land of Syria and Lebanon due to two main reasons. The first being that
France felt responsible to protect the Christian minority in the Levant63. The second
was that through their economic ties with the Ottoman Empire, France began building
an infrastructure in order to support their own economic ventures such as railroads
and silk production factories. These vested interests allowed France to give up their
right to Mosul and Palestine in order to maintain control over Greater Syria which
included Lebanon.
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The bases for such an agreement stemmed from the Sykes Picot Agreement of
1916. During this agreement France and Britain came to a settlement over who will
control which territories, this was later ratified by Russia. This agreement was secret
in nature and ultimately would have placed Britain in a position where it would have
had to turn its back on promises of independence made to Arabs. The colonial powers
haphazardly drew borders in the Middle East in accordance to their own interest
therefore completely disregarding the ethnic divide on the ground. In their agreement,
these powers used the specific terminology: “territory that is now Syria, Lebanon,
Israel, the occupied territories, Jordan and Iraq”64. The use of the term territory was
on purpose to indicate the fact that these states were “created” by France and
Britain65. This agreement left a legacy of instability in the region. Marina Ottaway
commented on this agreement saying “the borders that were eventually established
bear almost no resemblance to the lines drawn—in exquisite imperial fashion—by the
two diplomats whose main concern was to decide how Britain and France would
divide among themselves the Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire” 66. Some scholars
disagree with the extent to which the Sykes Picot agreement had an impact on the
Middle East. Scholars such as Sara Pursley argue that the agreement was a reflection
of the reality on the ground and that the present day map does not resemble the Sykes
Picot map67. While this may be the case, this agreement was a political determinant to
the development of nationalist movements in countries such as Syria. The colonial
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policies which were placed as a result of this agreement are a precursor to the way in
which identities developed in Syria. The Sykes Picot Agreement placed Syria under
the sphere of influence of France and the policies which implemented tactics aimed at
disrupting nationalist movements and as it placed artificial barriers to Arab unity68.
This agreement was met with wide criticism from Arab nationalists who felt
betrayed by the British despite the fact that they often led uprisings against the
Ottomans in order to help Britain. Woodrow Wilson wrote the 14 points intended as
principles in order to criticize the lack of inclusion of the Middle East in determining
their own fate. The states were never consulted or given a choice in the manner
regarding which power would ultimately oversee their transition to independence.
Later on, the Syrian General Congress declared that it wanted an independent, unified
Syria which included modern Syria, Palestine, Lebanon and Jordan and deemed
France an unacceptable choice as the power which would oversee this transition. The
Congress also demanded that, if given the option, they would choose the United
States as a first option or Britain as a second.
After gaining control of Syria, France went about dividing the state into six
different states. They were divided along the lines of Damascus, Aleppo and Lebanon.
The north went to the Alawites, and the southern mountainous region went to the
Druze as well as a Alexandretta which would later on be given to Turkey as many
Turkish people were already living there. This tactic had many reasons behind such an
implementation. Firstly, much to the anger of the nationalists in Syria, this tactic was
seen as a divide and conquer policy which would cause even more separation of the
already divided state. It also made it very difficult for them to be able to reach Syrians
in other territories. This ethnofederal state, was in a sense a way to ensure that the
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Syrian people could not unite in order to ask for a unified government which was their
right as part of the Mandate Agreement.
Despite the League of Nations Charter pointing towards these states simply
overseeing the affairs within each country they were mandating, each colonial power
held absolute control within their state and as such France was able to set up a system
which was based on a tight electoral system as they were acting under the auspices of
the League of Nations. The process of gaining control of the territories was done
through the use of mass education in order to help introduce a common system of
Western education. The relationship of culture between Syria and France is not a new
one, but rather built on years of an influx of French merchants and missionaries.
Through their education polices, the French were capable of influencing the Syrian
national identity. Later on, the Syrians were allowed to makes changes to the
education system in which they sought to ensure the presence of Arabic as a language
as well as including national pride within the curriculum in order to help revive the
notion of a united Syrian nationalist sentiment.
The ethnofederal system which was enforced by the French while it was meant
to control the state, it ended up failing and would prove to be a source of problem for
Syrian governments until this very day. This ethnofederal system showed how “the
arbitrary nature of state creation following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and
the emergence of regimes striving to consolidate and maintain their authority within
highly artificial borders has forced issues of ethnic identity underground without
eradicating them”69. Studies have been done on the ethnofederal system, Henry Hale
establishes that this system is one “in which at least one constituent territorial
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governance unit in intentionally associated with a specific ethnic category”70.He
conditions that it must have at least minimal levels of democracy to succeed. Based
on his research he concluded that ethnofederations which have had core led systems
have collapsed because of the majority wanting independence, or the minority states
feeling threatened all of which leads to the federation as a whole fragmenting or
falling into civil war. He also makes the argument that an improved form
ethnofederations without a core ethnic region tend to succeed and cause less tension
between ethnicities. This case was not seen in Syria as eventually the ethnofederal
system did not succeed because it was forced upon by the French colonial power.
This ethnofederal system left many legacies in the Syrian political future. The
French also sought to create allies within the system they set up and looked towards
the Alawites for aid. As a result they fostered both the Druze and Alawites as allies
due to the fact that they were “were compact regional minorities with considerable
political unity”. This choice seemed only logical considering the fact that many of the
other ethnic minorities were minor and did not have enough of a geographic base in
order to unite the Syrians in favor of the French. As Ayse Tekdal Fildis discusses that
“even with French support, the Alawite and Druze communities were not viable as
national entities. Their autonomy mainly had been fostered by the French in an
attempt to break Syrian unity.”71 Yet through this tactic what the French succeeded in
accomplishing is creating “, minority consciousness, reinforced by a combination of
geography, religious differences, communal segregation and regional separatism, had
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a damaging impact on Syrian political life even long after the mandate”72.
The time of the French helped display the extent to which a colonial power
will go though to exercise control. The system that was created only succeeded in
highlighting the existence of the multiple nations within one state in Syria. Michael
Lynch cites Benjamin Miller again who argues that the contestation between the
“nation” and the “state” as “the most important driving force behind the conflict and
instability in the Middle East” 73. The mandate system failed in helping Syria instill
the basic institutional power needed in order to help create a stable state. Even 20
years after colonial rule, Syria was left “without independence, without institutions of
self-government and without territorial unity”74.
All states are inherently artificial in the sense that they were man made. In the
Middle East many states were built through decree and as such were divided up
through the Sykes Picot Agreement. The divisions were representations of political
intent on behalf of the colonial powers. Through the policies that were employed by
the French, it becomes evident that they were acting in the best interest of their
economic interests. The French had no sympathy for Arab nationalism and as such
ruled Syria and split it into several smaller units as an attempt to weaken the
movement. The French equated Arab nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism and
sought to eradicate it as they saw it as obstructing the spread of Western civilization
and economic interests; as such they preferred non-Sunni members75.
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Initially, the French considered themselves the guardians of the Maronites in
Lebanon. By doing this they triggered off a sense of competition among various
religious communities76. While these communities lived side-by-side, when an assault
was committed it was considered an affront to the entire community and there was no
shortage on leaders willing to exploit these tensions77. Colonial policies adopted by
France only sought to secure their economic and political interests. When justifying
their position they cited the fact that the people of Syria and Lebanon have called on
the French to help protect them from the Turks, and in return the French have brought
“order, freedom, honest finance, railroads, public works and hygiene”78. Policy
makers such as Robert de Caix, chief architect of the French policy in Syria, opposed
a unified Syria, arguing that it would end up having an Arab and Muslim majority and
would threaten French influence79. The policies of the colonial period only sought to
disrupt Arab nationalism and as such their best approach was to treat Syrians as
separate communities. The policies only intensified divisions and differences and
ended up elevating some minorities to preferred status at the expense of the majority.
Before the Sykes Picot Agreement, the French had an agreement with the
Ottoman Empire. When in 1860, thousands of Maronites were killed by Druze in
Damascus and Lebanon, the French, along with several other European powers,
entered into a protocol with the Ottoman Empire in which the French would send
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12,000 troops to provide order, and despite finding the state in order they still
occupied parts of Greater Syria and strategic port cities for a year80.
3.2 The Consequences of French Colonialism
The French colonial power used identity as a political tool in order to establish
its own power structure and maintain it. Under the French Mandate sectarian loyalists
were chosen on purpose in order to prevent the rise of Arab nationalism. Minorities
were allowed to create their own formally autonomous regions with their own
governments, through this support they enabled the notions of separatist groups and
further encouraged Syrian particularism. This further dented the ability to form a
national identity, through enabling autonomy and encouraging it. Even within the
military favoritism was even applied, whereby they favored certain groups in order to
repress minority rebellions. This is further to empower one group against the others.
"The fact that these troops were largely composed of minorities increased the
resentment among Arabic-speaking Sunnis. Discord between and within religious and
ethnic minorities was also provoked by the fact that the French played off one tribal
leader against another"81.
The use of identity as a political tool used by the French had a direct effect on
the development political structure on Syria for decades to come. “The development
of the political consciousness during the independence period showed the extent to
which sub-national loyalties were stressed over commitment to the nation state as a
whole”82. In this phase of the French plan, the encouragement of the subnational
identities helped give a chance for these to establish a separate identity from that of
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the Syrian identity. As opposed to being forced to be part of a larger “artificial”
identity then being separated into a nation state, these states were forced to essentially
place an artificial identity on a higher priority than their own, which is what occurred
as France removed the idea for separate states within Syria. In addition to separating
the Syrian state, “political efforts were continued in order to prevent any cohesive "or
definable loyalty to a Syrian nation state."83 Furthermore, when Syria became
independent it was in many ways a state without being a nation state, "a political
entity without being a political community... national politics [was] often defined in
terms of subnational regional, interests"84.
In the first few years since independence, attempts at developing a cohesive
national sentiment and weakening the sectarian effects of the Mandate were
accomplished through modernization such as railroads connecting the different
regions. Syrian nationalists continued to change the education system in an attempt to
help bring about a generation loyal to the idea of a Syrian nation. Furthermore,
through education being nationalized students were brought up less reliant on their
sectarian backgrounds. Author Nikolaos van Dam comments saying that during the
1960s a new generation were being brought up less religious thus deemphasizing the
sectarian ties85. Also, he points out that urbanization caused family ties to weaken.
This shows the different levels of loyalty that people have, which represent obstacles
to a unified Syrian identity. Weakening, ethnic and family ties represents different
levels of identity that cause divide amongst Syrians and therefore are considered
obstacles for Syrian nationalists. Moreover, the establishment of trade between the
different regions, as brought about by modernization was aimed at helping establish
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common connections between the different regions.
The use of identity by the French affected the development of political
opposition. The sectarian nature of Syrian politics is evident in the unfolding of the
political scene in the direct aftermath of the independence of Syria; many of parties
which were formed became based on regional, sectarian interests. And the
connections to which they were developed were "build up through traditional social
channels. The latter factor, in particular, was largely responsible for the continued
existence in Syrian political life of sectarian, regional, and tribal loyalties.86” The
traditional social channels were created based on the fact that as certain groups lived
in the same area, they shared the same grievances and as such created political parties
representing such. This is most evident in the rise of the Ba'th party.
3.3: The Creation of the Ba’th Party
The Ba'th Party was created in Syria in 1940 by Michel 'Afalaq and Salah alDin Bitar. Even though it was created in Damascus, it spread to other Syrian districts,
through the established trade routes between the different regions. The group heavily
focused on “constructing” a “Syrian” identity. The appeal of the group stemmed from
the appeal of the socialist ideology to poverty stricken areas. The party was
particularly popular in the rural areas because that is were the poorer segment of the
population lived, this coincided with where the minorities lived. Minorities were
attracted to the Ba'th idea of nationalism whereby everyone was equal essentially
"freeing themselves from their minority status and the narrow social frame of their
sectarian, regional and tribal ties"87. The ideology was contextually representative of
the grievances which were occurring in Syria at the time. The Ba’th party advocated
that socialism was a better ideology than capitalism, alignment with the Soviet bloc
86
87

Ibid., pg, 33
Ibid., pg, 33
44

was better than working with the imperialist West, secularism and modernization
would create equality amongst all members of society88. While the Ba’th ideology
aimed at rebuilding the state’s identity it can be seen as representing a different kind
of identity, which arguable came with its own consequences. The first issue is that this
represents the use of identities in order to create a larger political movement, and
when applied it became apparent that their calls for an identity based on equality
would be idealistic and the emergence of the Alawites as the dominant elite.
Moreover, while this was a different form of identity from that which previously
based on the different local identities, it is still not focusing on forming a Syrian
identity, due to the multitude of identities which existed in Syria and the different
interests along with the potential for conflict. As such, the political elite arguably
chose the Pan-Arab identity as a method of uniting Syrians behind an even more
powerful, more stable identity which is the Pan-Arab identity. Furthermore, with the
creation of Israel, it gave the perfect opportunity to unite Syrians behind a common
enemy and unite them behind a common cause which is freeing Palestine.
While the Ba’th ideology did rely heavily on the Pan-Arab identity it still
served the purpose of defining Syria and gave it a more “national” identity; moreover,
it also defined its identity through its place as part of a larger group. The appeal of the
Ba’th Party resonated with many segments in society. Within the Sunni sect, the rich
landowners presumed a liberal democracy would bring stability as well as maintain
the status quo, and with the poor disfranchised of the Sunni sect were hoping for
change from the capitalist landowning elite who were taking advantage of them. The
political calls of the group also included a more representative parliament which
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meant that more minorities could be included in the decision making of the country89.
Yet despite these attempts the constructed identity was and remains very fragile. As
Barry Rubin comments, many competing identities and ideologies all of which
wanted “a total victory for itself”90.
In 1963 a group of armed forces seize control of Syria through military coup
and led the country in the name of the Arab Socialist Resurrection (Ba'th) Party. The
party held appeal because of its "explicitly redistributive, populist platform, combined
with the dynamics of military rule" 91. Because they were so radical and attempted to
re-enact a comprehensive program of taking properties and redistributing them set the
platform for a more doctrinaire group to take over power92. Yet despite advocating
equality, many of the members were of minorities which due to the fact that the
officers involved called upon help from officers which they knew through tribal,
family, or regional ties93. This demonstrates how the aforementioned social channels,
which were created through the use of identity by the French, would still have a
strong effect on the way politics would play out. Those who were most affected
through the system were the minorities, and as such led a coup, and to call for
supporters they recruited members of their own ethnicity and kin.
Despite being overthrown later on, the political structure which was brought
about during this coup represented the political structure which currently shapes the
political structure in Syria. The Alawites rose to power as they comprised the most of
the numbers which were leading the coup, moreover they filled the gaps of the
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officers which were replaced from the power struggle between the Sunni members of
the coup94. There was an attempt at a counter coup which was organized by
predominantly Sunni members, this was violently suppressed and was exploited by
the Sunni politicians to portray a sectarian conflict. The Alawite officers used this as
an opportunity to purge the remaining mainly Sunni officers from the military. This
would weaken the Sunni representation within the military and the overall political
scene, but it also gave the opportunity for other minorities to be represented. The
aftermath of such an event was deep mistrust between the Sunni and Alawi groups.
Furthermore, there was discrimination against Sunni members when it came to
applying to the military and armed forces and preferential treatment was given to
minorities such as Alawis, Druzes and Isma’ils and Greek Orthodox Christians95. In
1966 another more radical, more doctrine-based group of officers seize control again
by coup and overthrew the government and applied a more radical version of the
Ba’th ideology. Later on in 1970 Hafiz Al-Assad, amongst other officers took control
again, in what was called the Corrective Movement in which he shifted the political
scene to a more politically and economically pragmatic one96.
3.4: Hafiz Al-Assad and the Consolidation of Power
Hafiz Al-Assad belonged to the Alawite sect and was born to a peasant family
he was also a member of the Ba'th Party97. The rise of Hafiz Al- Assad came after the
short lived experiment with the United Arab Republic, in which he and other officers
including most notably, Salah Jadid and eliminated the group in power for being too
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right winged. Later on during the events of Black September, Al-Assad refused to
give air assistance to tanks helping the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 98.
Furthermore, through another coup on November 16, 1970 he was appointed as the
Secretary General of the Ba'th Party and later the president of Syria99.
It is with no doubt that the structure which was set up represented the deep
ethic fragmentation which was present in the Syrian political system, whereby groups
have a vested interest in setting up a system which would enable their own power.
Despite helping form a common Syrian identity, the system that was created catered
predominantly to a certain group. Acts such as excluding one group and purging the
Sunni officials only caused more disparities amongst the society and cemented the
sectarian cleavages. After gaining power Hafiz Al-Assad went about cementing his
regime to ensure its resilience. This included the use of the main political party as an
extension of the regime. Hafiz Al-Assad set up a system in which the power was
shared amongst different institutions. This strategy is best seen through the
empowerment of the ruling party, The Arab Socialist Ba’th Party (ASBP), which
aimed to help protect the state from demise of ethnic civil war through unifying the
people behind a common pan-Arab identity, and was given an independent formal
role in political scene. This highlights the importance domestic conflict has in
determining the political strategies used by an authoritarian regime. Ethnic divide can
render a state weak, and as such Hafiz Al-Assad was incapable of “craft[ing] a regime
that asymmetrically favored his office above all others”100.
Hafiz used the party in order to expand the power of his own personal regime;
through this tool he has essentially blurred the lines between party and government
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therefore treating the party as an arm of the presidency. Hafiz Al- Assad also served
the role to make sure that the power of the Ba'th party be limited, or used as a tool by
the regime in the early days of its construction. This helped serve the role to make
sure it never became more powerful than the office of the presidency. Al-Assad
ensured that it served no role in internal security or army loyalty. Hafiz Al-Assad also
ensured that the structure which was created in order to ensure the stability of the
Alawites within the structure of the political system. Here it becomes evident that
identity is a tool that can help determine the structure of the regime, whereby people
can be chosen for positions based on their religious sect as a tool to ensure their
loyalty. The sectarian nature of the regime was mostly predominant by the fact that
the security apparatus was predominantly Alawite in order to ensure full support of
the Assad regime. The Syrian regime set up several ways to ensure their survival the
first being making sure a large number of Alawite are tied to the government,
managing the armed forces, this is a form of enforcing sectarianism as way to ensure
the survival of the regime. This is reminiscent to the tactic used by the French
mandate in which they chose the minorities as part of the military in order to put
down rebellions. This is a political decision to use the identity crisis, through
favoritism. While this may be a tool to ensure the authoritarian resilience of the
political elite, what it actually does is creates sectarian cleavages from within society.
In which the state becomes associated with a certain sect and as such anger becomes
directed to the sect which is seen as the entity controlling the apparatus. This can
cause ethnic violence driven by a sense of anger and injustice.
Despite Hafiz Al-Assad ensuring that Sunnis remained out of the security
apparatus as best as possible, he still used them in order to further solidify the status
of his regime. Author Salwa Ismail argues that saying that the political scene in Syria
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is one ruled by the Alawite is simplistic which she argues is because two of Hafiz AlAssad's most trusted advisors were Sunni.101Yet, despite this point, it is also important
to point out that this is not representative of the ethnic make up of the society.
Furthermore, she argues that there is a civilian decision making group in which
Sunnis are represented102. While this may be the case, in a personal authoritarian
system such as the one enforced by Hafiz Al-Assad, these decision-making bodies are
merely seen or regarded as puppets of the state in order to give the image of
legitimacy and equality. Ismail offers the alternative that the system is “political
Alawis”, in which the "authority and rule are Alawi, but that the Alawis do not rule.
This situation can also be described as the sectarianism of authority but not the
authority if the Alawis or the authority of the sect"103. While this may be an
interpretation of the system, the notion of an ethnic make up of the main apparatuses
of the state comprised of a certain ethnicity and favoritism towards certain sects in
order to promote loyalty this causing sectarian cleavages would give off the
impression of a rather favoritism oriented state. While Ismail may argue that the
sectarian characterization of Syria under Hafiz Al-Assad may be too simplistic, it
becomes quite accurate when looking at the sects who are left out of the political
structure. Through the use of identity politics, the Assad regime was able to alienate
the Kurds, thus showing how the sectarian cleavages can have destructive aftermath.
The aftermath of the sectarian discrimination can be seen through the Kurdish
case. Under the Hafiz Al-Assad era, the dominating trends include two movements,
the first Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). These are the more radical one who
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advocate for a separate state and have renounced their identity as Syrian Kurds.
Another movement comprised of several groups calling for the end of discrimination
and the incorporation of Kurds into Syrian society104. Identity is a political
connotation, it can change by personal and political choices, and ramifications of
political use can shape it. What the followers of the PKK show is how the extreme use
and abuse of identity can cause some by political choice to renounce their identity and
essentially accept a new one. This is very dangerous for a state which has multiple
identities, who have experience in self governance, and when the state does not give
them equal rights, separatist movements began rising. The anger towards the Assad
regime can be seen later on in 2004 whereby when the Kurds were mass protesting
against Bashar Al-Assad, statues of his father were destroyed as a symbol of such
anger.
3.5 Hafiz Al-Assad and National Identity
Hafiz Al-Assad worked on several fronts to try to unify the people under a
common identity and prevent ethnic conflict. While ensuring the state is capable of
controlling the different ethnicities, it also attempted to reconstruct the Syrian identity
in order to have people look past their differences and focus on loyalty towards the
state. This is within the ideology of the Ba’th, which initially advocated the notion of
equality amongst all the members of the society without looking at individual identity.
The notion of state building especially in the Middle East is very difficult because in
many cases "nationalisms precede the state, and rather than foster state building,
ardently opposed it. Colonial boundaries of states rarely coincided with the
boundaries of preexisting communities. One aftermath of colonialism is the fact that
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the Syrian state had to work quickly to build institutions which deliver basic goods
and services would gain them allegiance. This speaks to the importance of goods and
services in making sure the citizens have a vested interest in making sure the
government is maintained. In the vacuum of a lack of government being able to
provide the basic goods and services, citizens are less likely to stay loyal to the state.
In countries such as Syria, the particular problems faced by successive regimes stem
largely from this incongruity between felt membership, and state authority, between
"national" identification and political organization"105. The Syrians under Hafiz AlAssad regime clung to the idea of Arab nationalism which speaks of a greater Arab
State, this further complicates the matter of artificial borders. One possible reason for
this is widening the points of similarities with even more people even further to add a
greater sense of belonging with more people.
Identity in a state such as Syria is essential as a political tool. It “represents a
powerful means for national elites to unite citizens within a territorially-bound
political community and to win consent for their political leadership. The discourse of
nationalism is constituted through the construction of an identity and culture that is
exclusive and different from those of other nations” 106. Throughout his tenure as
president Hafiz Al-Assad employed many tactics to gain loyalty of the citizens, going
so far as institutionalizing identity. The Ba’th Party is a representation of how identity
can become institutionalized as the party itself advocates a unified identity and as
mentioned in previous chapters it becomes apparent that the multitude of identities
have always existed within Syria, what made these multiple identities a point of
contention is when they were forced to unite under a common border under the
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auspices of state building. What further exacerbated these problems is the different
political powers who use these identities to suit their own purposes through
favoritism. Which leads to anger and animosity and consequently conflict due to a
lack of social cohesion.
The notion of a unified identity is essential for a state such as Syria as
“Citizens’ ideas of what… “Syria” [is], as [a] nation, helped determine which statebuilder constructed a system with centralized executive authority while the other
settled for decentralized executive authority. National identity, therefore, contributed
to the establishment of … Syria’s varying political orders by granting or precluding
the leader’s autonomy from the state’s institutions” 107. This was the first tactic used
by Hafiz Al-Assad which is himself.
Furthermore, in Syria, the use of identity can be seen as a political tool for the
elite to gain support of the people. Essentially through the creation of orchestrated
spectacles the state has caused a form of regimen in the citizens in an "order that
symbolizes and prepares for political obedience." 108. The regime used the symbols
and rhetoric as powerful tools to help people define what the Syrian identity entails.
Hafiz Al-Assad was able to construct his own image as part of the Syrian identity.
Through the framing of certain symbols and images "they ground political thinking in
the images and symbols the regime puts forth, framing ways people see themselves as
citizens, much as advertising offers people a frame in which they imagine themselves
as consumers"109. Essentially these tools when controlled by the state can have a
powerful effect on the way citizens come to define themselves while simultaneously
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giving the people something to feel pride in. The Syrian state under Hafiz Al-Assad
was capable of ensuring that citizens have a sense of belonging as well as something
to unite under. It was very common to use large spectacles to demonstrate the Syrian
unity through imagery such as art. One such example is pictures of the Syrian flag and
the Palestinian flag united together. This serves as imagery in order to reinforce the
idea of Arab unity and Pan-Arabism. Other images include those of Hafiz Al-Assad
himself.
In Syria, several images are set forth in order to unite people towards their
love for the Hafiz Al-Assad who was continuously represented as the beloved ruler of
the Syrian people. The Syrian state continued to construct the identity of Syria to
revolve around Assad, in which he was glorified for his political actions. For example,
national media glorified his participation in the October 1973 War, in which Assad
was represented as one of “the people”, and praised him for being a hero in combat.
The framing of this helped unify people to loyalty to not just the Syrian identity but to
political obedience. When demonstrating the ruler as a member of “the people” it
removes the emphasis over sectarian differences and demonstrates him as someone
who has a vested interest in the “nation”. Furthermore, when the gap between the
ruler and the nation is lessened and thus giving more loyalty to the ruler who has
become more relatable. Hafiz used to approach of building the Syrian identity around
loyalty towards the state and they became intertwined110. After the events in which the
Assad regime suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama in 1982, members were
required to give oaths of allegiance in order to demonstrate loyalty in the form of a
public oath111. In the case of the women of Hama, the “women and mothers of Hama
‘contract with the leader to sacrifice everything for the sake of the citizen and
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defending him”112. The use of the term citizen is a very powerful one because it has
an outstated notion of a state to be loyal to. This has institutionalized identity further
in the sense of making it a public official oath to the state constructed identity.
Furthermore, through making this a public, official oath, the state has also
institutionalized obedience in order to make sure people remain loyal to the state
which the “nation” must ensure its protection. The parameters of what the nation
entails is based on the framing which is presented by the state.
Another important tactic that was used by the Assad regime in order to
construct the state’s identity is uniting against a common enemy. In many cases Israel
and the West would be used as a common enemy and political rhetoric would be used
to show them as the reasons behind the failure of the unified Arab state. This serves as
making people focus on an issue other than the problems which were occurring within
the Syrian state.
The state integrated loyalty towards the ruler with loyalty towards the state
was to ensure absolute loyalty towards the regime. Through constructing a common
thread amongst all the different ethnicities in Syria it is able to avoid the trap of
having people eventually succumb to their differences. The symbolic power of using
familial metaphors to invoke feelings of kinship to the ruler and help weaken, or even
change the dynamic of some of the loyalties which are considered a priority for the
individual. In this chapter, the fact that loyalty towards kin, ethnicity and religion are
considered priorities to the individual is an obstacle to the state’s enforced identity,
and if a state is to overcome such a priority in order to ensure loyalty towards the state
it must enforce a different narrative or at the very least give an alternative. Through
demonstrating the ruler as a member of kin the state is able to extend on the
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individual’s feeling of loyalty to the family to feeling the very same way with regards
to Hafiz Al-Assad. Lisa Wadeen comments stating that this tactic is essential, as
“political theorists and ideologues in various historical epochs and places have
invoked metaphors of the family to define the terms of political membership. Political
narratives often displace the emotionally charged, immediately meaningful
relationship of family life onto the more impersonal, remote and abstract relations
between rulers and ruled or among citizens”113. Therefore the state frames and
constructs the relationship between the ruler and the ruled as a more sentimental one
and essentially creating a level of loyalty which is similar to that of the family. It
becomes evident that the state takes the local identities and reconstructs them on a
grander scale in order to show a level of loyalty that can be shared by all. This is
patriarchal connectivity and nation-building as Assad is the father figure114. The
nation building techniques by the state here are evident in order to find a way to
ensure that all members which have local loyalties become citizens to a Syrian nation.
This must be done through the use of imagery and metaphors which can resonate with
as many citizens as possible. Anthropologists have commented on the importance of
the Gramscian notion of hegemony in order to “indicate the importance of ideas,
signs, and images in producing dominant understandings that are taken for granted
and perceived as natural and commonsensical115”. This may have persisted within the
Hafiz Al-Assad era, yet the current events unfolding beg the question of the extent it
was possible for a state to successfully use the identities and enforce a state identity.
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By the end of his tenure as president, Hafiz Al-Assad through his policies
aimed at unifying the people, was successful at helping people place aside their
differences and achieve some level of cohesion. He was able to unify the people
behind the Pan-Arab, socialist policies. Yet his efforts were severely undermined by
the exclusivity of the military, which was necessary to ensure its loyalty to the regime.
The coercive apparatus of the state was the only guarantee that the status quo in which
the Alawites would stay in power.
3.6: The Political Economy of Sectarianism Under Hafiz Al-Assad
Authoritarian regimes, such as Syria, which are ideologically weak, their
survival is contingent on two main factors. Firstly, having massive security forces
which can guarantee the survival of the regime, and the second factor being the
regime’s ability to economically fund their patronage efforts in order to prevent
possible uprising116. In Syria, these two factors are evident in the political structure
which was implemented under Hafiz Al-Assad. In the military, he ensured that those
in power were from his sect and tribe as a means of ensuring absolute loyalty towards
the regime. The military was dominated of Alawites who would follow the orders of
the regime without question and acted as an arm of the regime.
Syria is what can be called a quasi-rentier state as it, “exhibit[s] the same
behavioral and policy patterns as the classic rentier states in stressing the allocative
function of the state and the circulation of rent throughout the economy over the
productive economic sphere”117. The reason states such as Syria can be characterized
as ideologically weak is because rentier states such as Syria, rely on ideologies such
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as socialism as a form of legitimacy. They become weak as they promise to provide
free services as a form of rent as opposed to taxing these services. Taxes, as opposed
to rent, are an essential part of state building as it creates ties between people and the
state and gives them an incentive to participate in the political arena. This fuses the
society further; therefore, through capitalizing on rent, the regime essentially weakens
the political development in Syria118. States such as Syria, pursue certain foreign
policy such as the return of the Golan Heights, in order to bind state and society in a
common incentive, thus further legitimizing the regime119.
Under the auspices of socialism, free services are an essential factor towards
the duties of the government towards the people. The government provides free
services such as health care and education and as such governmental authority, in
states such as Syria, were based on decades of patronage in which the government
provided basic needs such as education and health which is typical of quasi-rentier
states120. The patronage system which was initiated by Hafiz Al-Assad is what made
the system so fragile.
Syria has minor oil revenues, but in fact its “rent” is mostly derived from
foreign aid121. This aid came from foreign policies initiatives such as its anti-Iraq
position in operation Desert Storm. The problem with such tactics is that it becomes
heavily reliant on foreign policy, for example, after it sided with Iran, the aid dropped
significantly. The domestic policy of patronage within Syria was a form of “buying
off” citizens, this forms a patron-client relationship between, that while ensuring
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acquiescence of some socioeconomic groups to the regime it does not “necessarily
signal society's acceptance of the state's legitimacy”122.
These unorthodox economic practices have an even larger affect on states
which are based on sectarian policies. While Hafiz Al-Assad aimed for near social
cohesion, the method by which avoiding ethnic conflict was through patronage of
certain members within each sect. This had two main effects, the first being that it
disrupted social cohesion through the fact that it created cleavages between those who
were included in the economic privileges and those who were not, ultimately leading
to resentment within groups. Also, it led to the rise of crony capitalism specifically
within the Sunni sect.
While Hafiz Al-Assad maintained strict control of the security apparatus, he
used the Sunni sect in order to further the economic power of the regime. This can be
credited to a historical reasoning based on the creation of economic alliances between
the Sunni and the Alawite sects. This causes the ruling coalition to expand and the
creation of vested interests in ensuring the ruling elite continue their monopoly over
power123. The Ba'th Party during its more radical ways formed an alliance with the
merchant class which were predominantly in the Damascus Sunni areas therefore
expanding their power, furthermore eliminating and marginalizing the landowning
elite from the political scene through liquidating their assets. This caused mass
support because these "contributed to the rise of new social forces that provided the
party with widespread support... peasants and workers were major beneficiaries of
these policies. In turn, they gave their allegiance to the regime and constituted its
social base. These forces were absorbed through corporatist structures organized and
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managed by the party"124. Even when Hafiz Al- Assad rose to power and restructured
the economy he used it to make new alliances to further extend the support of the
ruling party. The alliance between the Sunni group and the Assad regime is a
quintessential foundation for the regime. When looking into the importance it should
be noted that these groups constitute an important bulk as they comprise the majority
of the private businesses and employ a large section of the labor force125.
Through the maneuvering of identity Hafiz Al-Assad ensured that the social
groups that were most loyal to him controlled the most important state apparatuses
such as the ruling party which was responsible for the ideology of the state, the
security apparatuses which were responsible for ensuring the continuation of the
regime, and even offering economic incentives to other sects such as the Sunnis so
that they may have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. The aftermath of
such events were apparent during the mass strikes in 1980 which were seemingly
inevitable, the Sunni merchants were mostly in Damascus did not participate, which
shows how to Assad regime had coopted them126.
The use of identity is a critical tool that is used by the political elite in a
society. Bearing in mind that they have interests, be they political or economic, these
elites will ensure that the state avoids ideological vacuums as they have the potential
of driving the state into civil conflicts and thus cause a crisis on legitimacy and risk
their interests. Hafiz Al-Assad rose to power under the auspices of socialism. In
addition to social equality being in the main platform, agrarian reform was critical to
ensure the support of the masses. Hafiz Al-Assad was faced with the problem of
alienating the landlords in the process of redistributing the land, but through placating
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these elites he was able to gain their support and have them invest in the economy127.
This policy is in keeping with the patronage that was offered by Hafiz Al-Assad in an
attempt to gain support from the masses who now felt a sense of debt towards Hafiz
Al-Assad for alleviating them of their poverty. This also contributed in gaining
legitimacy for the regime as it was seen as helping the people. With this level of
support base, Hafiz Al-Assad was able to keep different groups content with
maintaining the status quo. Already, globalization had caused some problems under
Hafiz Al-Assad as he began opening Syrian markets to foreign goods. As a result,
local tradesmen were left behind leaving a large segment of the working class feeling
alienated and resentful from the regime’s socialist policies, eventually causing some
to join militant Islamic groups128. Conflict between the regime and workers over
market mechanisms in dealing with suppliers and wholesalers eventually prompted
discontent amongst a large sector of workers129. But Hafiz Al-Assad was able to curb
this discontent through policies aimed at helping improve the private sector in the
economy, showing once again, his ability at avoiding potentially disrupting his
attempts at unifying people. The “patron- client” relationship that had been formed
between the state and selected members can be credited to the growth of the
government, which causes it to act in an economically irrational manner, as it engages
in with a considerable number of people to “ward off opposition... and thus are
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superfluous and purely parasitic and, in effect, hamper the functioning of the
administrative machine”130.
Under the reign of Hafiz Al-Assad sectarianism was politically relevant to the
maintenance of his regime. In a political context, Hafiz Al-Assad used sectarian
policies in order to ensure that the military was under the strict control of the regime,
and the only way by which he could ensure this was through sectarian policies. The
Syrian army under the time of Hafiz Al-Assad was a very exclusive institution which
was comprised of Alawites. This exclusivity was brought about through several
radical coups in which other sects such as the Sunnis and the Druze were completely
removed from the regime. Hafiz Al-Assad relied mainly on his sect when it came to
the military in order to consolidate his power and ensure the protection of his system.
A coup within the military could mean a loss of power and the relegation of the
Alawites to the outskirts of political power as they are a minority. This minority
complex is what drove Hafiz Al-Assad to secure the military. While the military was
the case in which he could not relent in, in society he took a different approach. Hafiz
Al- Assad advocated both a unified Syrian identity and a Pan-Arab identity. Assad
built this image based numerous factors such as highlighting Israel as the enemy
which seeks to destroy Arabs and Palestinians, which helps people focus on issues
other than their sectarian differences; therefore, as opposed to seeing each other as the
enemy, Hafiz directed this sentiment towards Israel. This tactic, whereby Hafiz AlAssad helped construct a Syrian identity and a highlighted the pan-Arab ideology,
helped people set aside their differences and focus on their similarities, to the extent
that he was successful in forming a near cohesive state.

130Batatu,

Hanna. The Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi Revolutions: Some Observations on
Their Underlying Causes and Social Character. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown
University, 1984.pgs, 13-14
62

This chapter sought to show the method in which the Syrian political structure
was heavily rooted in the political maneuvering of the identity crisis. The structure
which was set up by the French mandate created sectarian cleavages due to the
political maneuvering of the different identities by the French causing mass discontent
due to the favoritism policies. When Syria gained independence, it was left with an
ideological vacuum and forced borders, which prompted the development of
ideologies such as the Ba’th ideology which aimed at making Syrians look past their
kinship, sectarian and ethnic identity in order to find a more unified identity. Despite
that being the official discourse, the political structure was dominated by the minority
Alawites and through the use of violence was able to suppress the opposition. The
idea of ensuring loyalty through favoritism seems acceptable only on the level of the
political elite in order to ensure their stay in power, but if allowed on a national level,
can threaten the position of the ruling elite, and thus a state can advocate a national
identity yet still practice unofficial sectarian policies. The Alawites then sought to
dominate the state’s official apparatuses such as the security and even the presidency
led by Hafiz Al-Assad, and through initiative to use identity he was able to gain an
alliance with the Sunnis in order to give them a vested interest in maintaining the
status quo. Throughout the Al-Assad’s time the state sought to construct a unified
Syrian identity in order to maintain unity and prevent ethnic violence through
discourse, imagery and metaphors, yet this was still often met with resistance from
groups and met with violence from the regime, highlighting the perks of having an
ethnically loyal army to help maintain the status of the elite. This system is a very
fragile one and requires multiple levels of political maneuvering and requires the state
to be able to maintain its position as a provider in the eyes of the people. With the end
of Hafiz Al-Assad’s regime, Bashar Al-Assad sought to enforce similar means, yet by
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the end of his time the true fragility of the system became apparent.
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Chapter 4: Identity under Bashar Al-Assad
This chapter looks into the tactics which were employed by Bashar Al-Assad
which greatly resemble the tactics which were employed by his father aimed. This
policies contained two main elements, the first being uniting the different identities
under a unified umbrella, the second being ensuring that through the use of patronage
to gain support from within each sect to have an element of support and ensuring
control.
With the death of Hafiz Al-Assad, his son Bashar was quickly instated into
power in what can be argued as a smooth transfer of power. While there may have
been fundamental differences between the two rulers, such as the extent of military
background as well as upbringing, Bashar employed many of the same tactics that his
father used in order to ensure the domination of the Alawites as the political elite and
therefore, ensuring his continuation in power. In order to ensure his stay in power
Bashar was keen on reaffirming the secular nature of the state, yet at the same time
reinforcing the ideals of pan-Arabism. The use of pan-Arabism is a tool which was
used by his father in order to unite people under an umbrella which highlighted the
looking past individual identities and fostering a sense of belonging as part of a larger
identity. Bashar further promoted an Arab nationalist ideology in order to take the
attention off the fact that his regime is comprised of minorities. According to him
"Syria is diversity" this helps project the image of unity in order to gain legitimacy
from within Syria as well as abroad131. Further, he "blamed everything wrong with
Syria, Arabs, and Muslims on America, Israel and the West" 132. This was an essential
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aspect to the solidification of his power and the stability of the state, because had he
advocated the identity of the state as pertaining to one certain sect or ethnicity, this
would have caused resentment from the other religions133.
4.1: Secular Sectarianism under Bashar Al-Assad
In order to begin creating a support base for his own rule, Bashar used many
of the same tactics which were employed by his father despite the fact that he did not
have to rely on his Alawite identity in the first few years of power due to the relative
smooth transition of power. He grew up in Damascus therefore was more
"comfortable with his Syrian identity, which was more meaningful and actual for him
than his Alawite identity"134. He went about using his own image in order to unite
people. He did this through removing the pictures of his father from the streets and
limiting the flattery directed at his father in the press135. He greatly relied on the
system which was set up by his father which is a one-man system that was dependent
on the military for power. He stressed the importance of the Syrian identity as the
main unifying factor between all citizens, yet at the same time used the grand rhetoric
of the Arab identity which helped unite people even further. This tactic is similar to
the one used by his father in order to ensure that people would overlook the
differences between the different sects, religions, and ethnicities. Bashar Al- Assad
used tactics such as uniting people against a common enemy and behind a certain
conflict. In this case he used conflict was the Palestinian conflict which was used to
rally people behind him, urging them to set aside their differences and to further
solidify their belief in the Pan-Arab ideology. On a domestic level this achieved a
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very important purpose which was achieved through rhetoric which framed the anger
"within a state-centered nationalist rhetoric and finding common ground with Muslim
activists" 136.
One of the most significant issues which Bashar inherited rom his father was
the sectarian strife which dominated the political scene. It required that he find a way
to balance the very delicate issue. The reason this was a significant challenge to his
rule was because of minority character of the regime. His father had the support of the
minorities with his economic reforms137. These reforms gave way to a network of
patronage in which some felt loyal to the elder Assad due to their economic benefits.
4.2: Power Consolidation
Bashar Al-Assad inherited an authoritarian system which was build upon the
tents of military rule. The system which was set in place by his father reflected the
ethnic tensions that existed in Syria previously and as opposed to creating social
cohesion through advocating a sense of common nationalism, the system only served
to highlight the extent of the ethnic favoritism which only served to increase tensions
between the different sects. The Alawites were a key player in Syrian politics through
virtue of its power and its advantaged status within the political system. Hafiz AlAssad ensured this through his control of the apparatuses which were essential to
maintaining control as well as warding off any internal threats to the established
system. The system that Bashar inherited reflected a personality based system where
by Hafiz Al-Assad was seen as a father figure and a source of unity amongst the
people. Furthermore, the system despite advocating equality was set up as a family-
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run, ethnic, tribal system, whereby those who are in power were amongst the Alawite
members as they were the most trusted138. In an attempt to gain control on his own
terms, Bashar retired old vanguard generals and promoted second rank Alawite
officers who would be loyal to him139. The regime reflected how the Alawite
community went from being a minority to the ruling power in the Syrian state and
continuously used propaganda to frame the political scene as such.
The system which he inherited was largely based on trusted members of the
Alawite community who were senior officers in the military, and despite the fact that
identity did not play as significant a role as it did his father in the early years of his
presidency, he still did nothing to change the system in place. Bashar Al-Assad did
not form any close relationships with people who were personally loyal to him, and
instead chose to remain "dependent on the formal hierarchical command and perhaps
on the tribal and communal solidarity fostered in his father's time, which was
sustained by force of inertia" 140. Hafiz Al-Assad's regime was built upon his reliance
on himself, an inner circle of trusted members as well as the military, all of whom
were comprised of either the Alawites, his family, and his tribe. A few exceptions
were given to Sunnis who had grown up with Assad and therefore shared his political
views141. The Alawites were well compensated under the Hafiz regime, and this trend
continued under his son, and as such even though many Sunnis were coopted in the
regime it can only be explained as a two-way vested interest relationship where by the
Assad regime was their best bet at maintaining their political, economic and social
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statuses142. The cost of the approach of building a regime based on those closest to
him from his family and the Alawites had a price. This cost is most reflected in the
affect it had on some of the states key institutions, "the gradual deterioration into
neopatrimonial rule: the party turned from an ideological movement into
institutionalized clientalism, with key loyalists co-opted through various forms of
patronage, corruption, and exceptions to the law that undermined economic
development, enervated capital accumulation, and debilitated the fiscal capabilities of
the state, and hence were unsustainable without continual access to various forms of
rent"143.
While the upbringing of Bashar differed from that of his father, which is most
evident through the role identity played in their policy formation, this chapter will
show how he came to use the idea of identity within Syria for political purposes, and
ultimately his use of identity sheds light on to the reasons behind the current civil war
in Syria. In a very similar method to his father, despite him advocating in favor of
secularism as well as national unity. The mechanisms Bashar Al-Assad set in place
only cemented the fact that the regime was dominated by a minority and sought to
ensure their consolidation of power.
4.3: Tension with the Sunnis
The Sunnis have consistently represented the most significant challenge to the
predominantly Alawite regime. The Sunnis comprise the largest group in Syria and
those most resentful towards the Assad regime. Under Hafiz Al-Assad he largely
excluded them from the military and through economic appeasement and patronage,
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he was able to keep a certain sector of the Sunnis loyal to his regime and as such was
able to avoid a full rebellion. In an effort to appease the Sunni sect, Bashar Al-Assad
took many decisions in order to help expand his loyalty base such as using religious
symbolism in order to ward off criticisms that regime was trying to be rid of religion
all together through the Assad regime’s advocacy of secularism. The idea of religious
symbolism was used in order to gain the support of specifically the Sunnis. The
Alawites, are considered a Shia'a sect, yet in order to project a certain image of piety,
Hafiz al-Assad made regular, publically advertised pilgrimage, raised the salaries of
religious clerics, as well as convinced clerics to highlight in their sermons that
Alawites were still Muslims144. Furthermore on an international level, Bashar AlAssad became a supporter of Islamist movements abroad such as Hezbollah145. His
handling of the different religions shows how identity can be used as a political tool in
order to gain more support.
Bashar Al-Assad would regularly exaggerate the fears that existed between the
different sects and would convince other groups such as Christians and the Druze, that
should his regime fail the ultimate replacement would be the radical Muslim
Brotherhood, this helped solidify his regime's position146. The tactic of using religion
as a political tool worked in the twofold, first, in order to help gain support of the
Sunnis and convince them that Muslim Brotherhood was a more radical group and
therefore, as liberals, their best interest fell on the side of the regime. Secondly,
emphasizing on the notion that despite the Alawites being a Shi’a sect they were still
all Muslims. With the other groups he would emphasize how the Muslim Brotherhood
in power would result in a more radical regime, therefore portraying his regime as the
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lesser of two evils. He also had certain tactics in order to help keep the Sunni majority
in check through "giving their religion more freedom of action and taking up Islamist
causes abroad" 147.
The Alawite community enjoys special positions within the state. The political
system was established in a way that would ensure the protection of the Alawite group
through their occupation of the top military and intelligence positions. The biggest
evidence of the ramifications of such a sectarian system would be found in the nature
of opposition groups. The most notable being the Muslim Brotherhood who took
advantage of the resentment towards the Alawites and formed their group in the
1940s.
They gained their support through providing goods and services to the
community and as such gained popularity amongst urban Sunni traders. In general,
Sunni hatred towards the Alawites was due to several reasons, the first being the fact
that Sunnis did not consider them Muslims and as such declared them apostates.
Furthermore the resentment grew from the fact that the Sunni majority felt that as they
were in fact the majority they deserved better representation within the government.
As the resentment grew and the support for the group increased in numbers, the group
split into two distinct groups between those who advocated peaceful tactics to oppose
the regimes tactics and those who advocated for armed struggle148.
4.3.1 Islamists as Political Opposition
The history of the tensions between the Islamists as a political force is one
which has long been developing. The civil war in Syria, which is strongly framed
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along sectarian roots, and the regime, frames the radicals in a certain way in order to
generate more support. But, the Islamists during their earlier years, advocated their
need for the destruction of the regime not because of their sectarian nature, but rather
because they are an oppressive regime149. As previously mentioned, "Assad's political
strength... rests not upon his popular support but on his firm control of the armed
forces and secret police" 150. This was essential in order to counteract popular
uprisings that were led by the Muslim Brotherhood as well as the Sunni sect in
general. The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria was very popular in the 1940s as they
created welfare programs which helped gain them further popularity amongst the
marginalized and the alienated. One of their most popular welfare programs was their
educational, in which they sought to establish what was considered the true Islam and
reform through education151. The basic ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood is as
Olivier Carré explains is that “the Muslim Brothers have seen their role as innovators,
not by inventing a new Islam, but in creating a living, present-day Islam in the wake
of a wave of Islamic reformism”152. Its creator, Hassan al-Banna, saw that the Islamic
world was in a state of weakness, to which he credited the West and their influence on
the region. Al-Banna argued that there needs to be a removal of the influence of the
West on areas such as education and the importance of the notion of the Shura
Council which he advocated “should have thoroughly studied religious discipline” 153.
It advocates the notion of “Islam is the solution” driving its influence from previous
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reformists such as Mohamed Abduh and Gamal al-Din al-Afghani154. The Muslim
Brotherhood advocates the application of the teachings of the Quran and the Sunna to
everyday life and politics as it is has an immediate effect on the individual’s life. The
Muslim Brotherhood is a proponent of the Pan-Islamist ideology, and the application
of Sharia. The application of these teachings, according to the Muslim Brotherhood
should have a direct influence on the individual and essentially lead society back to
the teachings of Islam and help improve society.
The Muslim Brotherhood as a political movement has been a threat to many
regimes in the Middle East because of their support base due to their appeal to the
Islamic identity in people as well as their ability to have loyal supporters through their
welfare programs.
The Islamic Front is a vast organization comprised of several Islamic
movements of which the Muslim Brotherhood encompasses a large portion 155. When
calling for support under Hafiz, they tried to recruit the 'ulma through sending them
letters calling for unity amongst the Muslim community referring to historical events
such as the Prophet during the Battle of the Trench156. By calling for unity amongst
the Muslims, they are framing the situation along a sectarian framing. They are
establishing a we vs. them complex which further causes ethnic divides and tensions.
This helps show how the use of identity as a political tool in order to gain support.
The regime uses identity as a political tool in order to consolidate their power and to
create a support base. In this case, opposition such as the Muslim Brotherhood would
use their Sunni identity to fuel support for their group and they use the tensions that
exist between the sects to further validate their cause. Furthermore, the Islamists were
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advocating in their changes within the Syrian military which they felt needed to be
strong in order to combat the regional threat of Israel157. This posed a great challenge
to the regime who survived based on their control of the military through employing a
network of Alawites.
Many of the political decisions that he took were aimed at delegitimizing the
criticisms dealt to him from Sunni groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood who
would criticize the government for being infidels158. To ensure that the Muslim
Brotherhood did not gain support through their criticisms of the regime, Bashar AlAssad overturned his father's decree that had forbidden women from wearing
headscarves. He also passed a decree which allowed soldier’s to pray in military
camps, went on several public pilgrimages, as well as built mosques which would
help overturn the image that the Muslim Brotherhood wanted to advocate.
The history of Islamic opposition against the regime has been very violent on
both ends. The areas of Aleppo and Hama were traditionally seen as pro militancy and
in 1979 Islamic extremists attacked the Aleppo Artillery School killing 83 Alawite
cadets and wounding many others. The Muslim Brotherhood blamed a splinter group
called the Fighting Vanguard, but the government took advantage of the incident and
launched a propaganda campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood and framing the
incident as an attack against Alawites. While the group tried to frame the event as a
victory against the Ba'th army, the government control of the media ensured that their
framing would be the more dominant one159. This framing is a representation of the
political operation of events to show a certain political message; in this case it is the
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fact that the Alawite minority are under threat and thus justifying the actions of the
regime. Furthermore, this was a way to gain further support within the military in
order to ensure that the Alawites maintained their power in the state through their
control of the military.
In 1982, an uprising in the city of Hama started whereby the Brotherhood
militants attacked and killed Ba'thist officials in their homes, and began to siege the
city160. This prompted a violent response from the government who gave citizens only
hours to evacuate and shelled the city, killing over 10,000 people161. The events in
Hama, and the regime's violent actions incited a strong sense of needed retribution by
the Muslim Brotherhood. All these events triggered what can only be labeled as a
minority complex on behalf of the Alawites which prompted their responses towards
both sectarian movements for separatism, or even challenges from other
movements.162
Other groups than the Muslim Brotherhood opposed the favoritism of the
Assad regime towards only certain factions of Syrian society. While Bashar had some
Sunni advisors, there is still fundamental political opposition over the fact that the
government was never representative of the ethnic make up of the society. Moreover,
these Sunni advisors benefitted directly from the Assad regime and therefore had a
vested interest in maintaining the Alawites in power. They were a select few,
therefore they were well compensated within the established structure. This lead to
resentment on behalf of the opposition due to the fact that these select few would not
advocate in favor of the cause of equality amongst the different ethnicities and
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religions in Syria.
When Bashar Al-Assad first took over power, activists were very optimistic
under the impression that he, as a member of the seemingly liberal youth, by virtue of
his education and age, would instigate pro-democratic reforms. Opposition members
such as Riyad Sayf, the founder of the National Dialogue Club and one of the more
independent members of parliament asked for permission to form a new party called
the Civil Peace Movement. He criticized the government for its application of failed
socialist policies under the auspices of Pan-Arabism163. Moreover, these policies
recommended by Sayf, a Sunni well known for being pious and for having good
connections with both the liberal and more conservative members of the Sunni
community, would transform Syria into a pluralist democracy which would
"accommodate the county's different religions and ethnic groups" 164. This was met
with huge criticism from the government who preferred a unitary state in which the
Alawite group were in power and the method to unify Syrians and prevent an uprising
is to advocate an Arab nationalist identity.
The reasons behind such opposition are very similar to the government
opposing and change which would threaten the structure of the state. Should such a
plan be implemented it placed the risk of the Sunni majority rising and overthrowing
the Alawite system. While Bashar had some Sunni advisors, there were still
fundamental political differences between the Sunnis in power and those who were
not. His vice president, Abd al-Halim Khaddam, a Sunni who had criticized the Sayf
plan as being a plot to overthrow the country into civil war as well as being instigated
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by the West, defected and join the Muslim Brotherhood. The idea of using the West
as a target to point towards any troubles is a method which was continuously used by
the regime in order to unite the people. As mentioned earlier, the pan-Arab cause was
upheld by the Assad regime in order to unify people behind a common identity and as
part of the colonial legacy which was left, blaming the West for mistakes and times of
trouble is often used to direct anger away from the regime towards a different entity.
Should the anger at issues such as the economy be directed at the regime, the
opposition would gain power and the regime would be directly threatened.
Moreover, what exacerbated the ethnic tensions in Syria in 2003 were the
influx of refugees from Iraq. The Iraqi War had several implications towards the
regime in Syria; it helped give credibility towards the anti-West sentiment which was
widely used by the regime. Also, the opposition began thinking that it would pressure
the regime take action for reform out of fear of American intervention. The war also
had many socio-economic implications which strained the already fragile ethnic
balance which existed in Syria. The first wave of Iraqi refugees were predominantly
Sunni Arabs, later on refugees tended to be from the Shia'a sect, but they were from
the poorer class165. The Syrian regime permitted these refugees to seek medical
attention in public hospitals and their children to public schools.166 This caused a
problem because these institutions could not accommodate this influx and as a result
their ability to provide services for Syrian citizens suffered. The refugees also seeking
a place to live and food to eat specifically in Damascus caused a notable increase in
prices of basic staples, combined with the increase in crime rates were among the
reasons for increasing tensions between the Sunni community and the Shia'a
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community167.
4.4: Tensions with the Druze
The Druze are one of the many different sects within Syria who have a
minority status. Unlike the Sunnis, the Druze occupy a better position with the regime
than the Sunnis, and this is because they rely on them as a secondary support group as
a fellow minority. Hafiz Al-Assad stressed the importance of the Druze as a support
group. The Druze were members of a coalition of minorities ensuring the power of
Assad and the Alawites as they guaranteed their status as well as their personal and
economic security168. Assad changed the political scene through framing the situation
as either himself in power or the radical Islamists who were viewed as a threat to
these minorities.
The regime, as with the Sunnis, employed in-group favoritism to ensure that
there were a select loyal few within the support base. This patronage only highlighted
that there is a weakness in the system because it relies on support through a form of
bribery, therefore prompting the regime to continue providing patronage otherwise
they may lose the support of these minorities. Favoritism was also used in within the
Druze group. Bashar Al-Assad would develop ties with the prominent Druze Arslan
family, “whom the Syrians promoted as a counterweight to the Jumblatt family, the
historic rivals of the Arslans for primacy in the Druze community”169. Applying
favoritism not only caused tensions within groups, it also created tensions across the
different groups in Syria.
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Tensions between the different ethnicities seem prevalent which is seen
between the Druze and the Sunnis. In November of 2000 a fight was started between
Sunni Bedouins and Druze which can be credited to the growing economic
difficulties. The fight engulfed several villages and it required armored vehicles and
elite battalions in order for peace to be restored. These events resulted in the death of
20 people and the injury of hundreds170. These events triggered mass protests in the
Druze community, which prompted the interior ministry to release members who
were detained in the protests. This signifies how economic difficulties can often
escalate into ethnic tensions between the different groups. A Lebanese Druze leader,
Walid Jumblatt, gave a very strongly worded speech regarding Bashar Al-Assad
stating, "You yourself are an insignificant, criminal, and hostile minority... We want
blood vengeance from Bashar. Oh ruler of Damascus, it is you who are the slave, and
we are free"171. Analyzing this quote gives a direct insight into the level of resentment
towards the regime. In this case, Jumblatt uses the word “minority”, this shows how
efforts by the regime to promote equality amongst the different sects as to be failing.
There is also a direct threat of violence, which speaks of the resentment which other
groups feel towards not just the Assad regime, but through his actions towards the
Druze, it transcended to hatred towards the entire Alawite minority. Furthermore his
use of the words “slave” and “free” shows how this favoritism has lead to a feeling of
inferiority within the social structure of the Syrian society. This quote indicates an
attitude towards rebellion against the Assad regime driven my an inferiority complex.
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4.5 Tensions with the Kurds
The Kurds are arguably the most mistreated group by the Alawite dominated
regime. They are often treated as second-class citizens and are even denied the Syrian
citizenship. While during the invasion of Iraq, the Kurds saw it was an opportunity for
the Syrian regime to be overthrown, the regime was counteracting the Bush Doctrine
through turning a blind eye to the insurgents that were crossing into the Iraqi
border172. The threat of the Kurdish movement is significant to the security of the
regime, because the Kurds are a transnational identity with support in neighboring
countries such as Iraq and Turkey. The Kurds have largely been a separatist
movement which directly threatens the territorial integrity of the state highlighting the
extent to which multiple ethnicities can fracture a state. Where as with the Sunnis and
Druze there is selective favoritism leading to in-group as well as cross group
resentment due to alienation, the Kurds have never accepted the Alawite dominated
regime.
The Kurdish movement began gaining strength and emboldened as a result of
the influence of the Kurdish Iraqi nationalist movement and began engaging in larger
communal civic activism. In a soccer match, Kurdish fans taunted the opposing team
by waving pro George W. Bush and Kurdish flags. The fans of the opposing team
responded by shouting pro Saddam Hussein slogans173. This taunting led to a clash in
which hundreds of Kurds were arrested. "On the one year anniversary of the incident,
Kurdish activists staged a sit in outside the High Court in Damascus demanded an end
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to the long running state of emergency. This protest was broken up by club wielding
cadres of the Ba'th Party affiliated students"174.
For years the government's approach to dealing with the Kurdish problem was
through oppression by tactics such as denying the Kurds citizenship and justifying this
through saying that they were actually Iraqi Kurds. Moreover while the regime dealt
with the Kurds in an oppressive way, they still tried to pacify them through minor
reforms in order to prevent an all rebellion which they feared would be fully
supported by the Americans who supported the autonomy of the Kurds in Iraq175.
Furthermore, when Jalal Talebani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan was
elected as president of Iraq in 2005, the Kurds of Syria celebrated and went so far as a
leading Kurdish member, Shaikh Mohamed Ma'shuq al-Khanzawi, telling
international reporters that the Syrian regime must change or it must be removed and
credited his ability to speak against the regime to the Americans176. The context of his
speech must be taken into mind. During the time of his statements the Bush
administrations were at war with Iraq, and this sparked fear across the dictators of the
Middle East prompting efforts at liberalizing their regimes. Al-Khanzawi said that the
American forces were going to "get rid of dictators and help the oppressed", he later
disappeared which caused a new round of mass protests that were met with mass scale
arrests by the security forces177. This shows the extent of the affect transnational
identities can escalate and develop in accordance to their development elsewhere.
This would have a direct effect with Syria, due to the fact that they cannot be
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contained through borders, because Bashar Al-Assad cannot isolate the Syrian Kurds
from the Iraqi Kurds. The Kurdish separatist movement has long been a thorn on the
side of the regime as they threaten the dominance of the Alawite, and also because
they threaten the narrative that the regime wishes to promote a unified Syria where
minority ethnicities are secondary to the Syrian identity, should the Kurds succeed in
creating their own state, that would threaten the ideological foundation of the fragile
state and have implications on the other minorities as well.
The regime has a tendency to get rid of any opposition that threatens its
power. For example, Sayf was brutally beaten to send a certain message. AlKhaznawi a prominent Kurdish activist who worked for the Kurdish cause with aid
from secular groups and the Muslim Brotherhood was killed by the government178.
This political targeting of certain members in certain ethnic groups only serves to
exacerbate the tensions between the different ethnic groups within the Syrian state.
4.6: Identity Politics
Both father and son have skillfully used the identities over the years to ensure
that they had a strong loyal base to which they could rely on. They played on the fears
of the potentiality of the repressive nature of a Sunni regime. He also had the support
from the Sunni businessmen who were part of the military mercantile complex.
In addition to influencing identity from within Syria, Bashar Al-Assad would
maneuver identities in neighboring countries such as Lebanon. After a policy of
interference in Lebanon in order to empower the Shi'a group, the Syrian state
assassinated Rafiq Hariri, a Prime Minister well known for his anti-Syrian stance. At
the same time, Bashar's enemies within Syria were beginning to be more vocal about
their oppression. "Militancy is the glue that holds Syria together and keeps Bashar
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stuck to the throne. For other Arab countries... a more limited, largely verbal
militancy suffices because they already have a more coherent identity to hold together
their societies. In contrast, Syria... had a greater need to incite foreign conflicts in
order to hold together ethnically and religiously diverse”179.
Furthermore, Bashar’s is also well known for the political use of the pan-Arab
identity to his own need. Despite him advocating that pan-Arabism called for unity
across the Middle East, he conducted his foreign policy in a much different manner.
The Syrian regime was simultaneously able to benefit from Arab nationalism “even
while violating its most cherished principle since it allied itself with Iran against most
of the Arab-speaking world. With the Alawites identifying as Shia'a Muslims, like
those in Iran, Bashar's strategy also put him on the wrong side of that divide from the
standpoint of the Arab majority"180. His strong alliance with Iran shows how
sectarianism is a cornerstone of his domestic policy. In addition to being a strong ally
of Iran, he was also a strong supporter of Hezbollah thus highlighting their form of
selective pan-Arabism as hypocritical.
The current civil war in Syria can be connected to multiple reasons, identity
politics, implemented through the use of tactics the ethnic framing is what caused the
resentment between the different groups. The reactivation of local identities can be
credited to failures of the Syrian state that can be traced back to the beginnings of
Bashar Al-Assad’s presidency. When the Arab Spring began it encouraged ethnic
conflicts to implode and engulf the state, causing the Syrian state to ultimately be
labeled as a failed state and people to resort to their local identities.
The failures can be seen in the Ba’th party, the ideological foundation of the
Syrian state intended to unify the people. The ruling party, the Ba'th party while may
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have increased in number of members, it was only showing how weak the party was
as people were beginning to join simply to gain access to the benefits and to ensure
their own personal future181. By the early 1990s it became apparent that the increase
in Ba'th membership was indicative that it transformed into an all-inclusive mass
party which meant that people joined for their own personal gain rather than the
ideology182. The decline of the party as a patronage network meant that the regime
became susceptible to the counter insurgency of the Islamic movements such as the
Muslim Brotherhood whose charity networks filled a gap in society which the
government was incapable of filling. As time went about this decline led to the party
losing many of its rural supporters such as the Sunnis, who at the rise of the civil war
began abandoning the party all together. This shows how the party which was created
to signify the secular, unified identity of the Syrian people was beginning to lose its
legitimacy and appear more a representation of corruption and favoritism which was a
policy of the Syrian state. In June of 2003 a historic decision was made to separate the
"authority between the party and the governmental institutions of the state"183. While
some members supported such a decisions, others did not and amongst those were
Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam who opposed on the grounds that it would
threaten identity184.
The Ba'th ideology was very relevant for a while, which helped unify people
under a common umbrella, and thus the ability to marginalize religious and ethnic
identities became possible, but after the 1990s, there was a decline in Arab
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nationalism which caused an ideological vacuum. The response by the regime was to
stress secularism. This ideological vacuum caused a rise in defensive religious
opposition such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi movement185. The tensions
between the regime and the Sunni majority is not new, it stems from groups such as
the Muslim Brotherhood never accepting the regime as legitimate.
4.7: The Political Economy of Sectarianism Under Bashar Al-Assad
Another important issue which highlights how Bashar Al-Assad implemented
identity politics in order to ensure that the regime had a certain loyalty base was the
way economic liberalization was handled. A certain amount of Sunnis had economic
privileges under Hafiz Al-Assad and when met with demands that this pool expand, it
was rejected by the regime186. This was because the government feared it would help
create an independent entrepreneurial class that would potentially change the political
scene, as they would demand more change and thus strengthen their claim to govern
as the majority187. The strong possibility that in any democratic elections the Sunni
majority, possibly Islamist, would seriously threaten the Alawite political structure is
enough a deterrent for the regime to reject any liberalization reforms. The way Bashar
Al-Assad overcame this challenge was through opening economic opportunities to a
select group of Sunnis in order to expand his support base. This was very similar to a
tactic which was used by his father, which reflected a military mercantile complex.
Under Hafiz Al-Assad this complex ensured that he empowered a certain segment of
the Sunni elite economically and as such, they supported him when he wanted to
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overcome the Muslim Brotherhood188. This is a similar tactic used by the French to
use identities in order to raise sect against the others. Furthermore, the opening of
economic opportunities to a certain select group who they were related to through
either familial, political, social connections and essentially coopting them led into an
unequal distribution of the wealth across the state189.
The level of tension between the different ethnicities shows how fragile the
state is. First, the Sunni majority felt bitter about the privileges which they felt were
given to the Alawite elite, as well the fact they were being marginalized. Furthermore,
this was exacerbated by the fact that only a select few Sunnis were granted economic
privileges, which caused a sense of resentment amongst Sunnis as well, which groups
such as the Muslim Brotherhood capitalized on. Bashar was able to secularize the
political and social life in order to appeal to as many minorities as possible. He was
able to gain support through patronage as a means to expand his popularity as much
as possible190. This came through land reforms which benefited Sunnis, as well as
appeasing some Sunni members191.
Under Hafiz Al-Assad, the economic policies that were introduced appeared to
gain for the regime a lot of influence and strengthen the President’s appeal to various
ethnic and religious groups including the Sunni merchants and peasantry. However, as
the process of globalization under Bashar Al-Assad began to take its toll on the Syrian
population, especially in the rural areas and poverty stricken quarters in Aleppo and
Damascus, the appeal of the regime suffered gradual erosion.
Bashar Al-Assad was not as successful at managing the economic sector of the
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country; his policies eventually were the cause of great discontent in Syria. At the
beginning of his presidency, one of the main criticisms he faced was the
disproportionate allocation of public revenues towards state run enterprises.
Furthermore, the distribution of investment money was unpredictable and often
attributed to noneconomic factors, causing discontent192. The liberalization efforts
employed by Bashar Al-Assad and the networks he set up in order to ensure support
only resulted in further disparities in society as it bred a new elite that had an interest
in maintain the status quo thus highlighting the importance of the crony capitalists
within the regime193. The influx of refugees in Syria from Iraq also caused economic
problems as the state’s inability to provide services created tensions against the
predominantly Sunni refugees. The influx of refugees has caused problems such as
increasing rent, which represents a significant burden on the Syrian budget194. It is
also important to mention that with the fluctuating prices of oil and inflation rates and
their direct effect on individuals, the tenants of socialism, which were a unifying
aspect under the Hafiz Al-Assad regime, become less legitimate in the eyes of the
people causing further tensions.
The Syrian economy has long been state controlled, policy makers fear
complete liberalization as it would directly threaten the elite as they would lose grip
of their economic privileges195. Under Bashar Al-Assad, unemployment rates have
risen exponentially, with the regime manipulating the statics in order not release the

192Raphaeli,

Nimrod. "Syria's Fragile Economy." Middle East Review of International
Affairs 11, no. 2 (June 2007).pg, 41
193Haddad, Bassam. Business Networks in Syria: The Political Economy of
Authoritarian Resilience. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012.pg, 171
194Raphaeli, Nimrod. "Syria's Fragile Economy." Middle East Review of International
Affairs 11, no. 2 (June 2007).pg, 37
195 Ibid., pg, 34
87

actual figures196. This aftermath can be linked to the patronage system which was set
in motion by Hafiz Al-Assad. As a rentier state, Syria provided free education to
everyone, this resulted in a large number of educated, consciousness youth who had
access to the world through the internet, and as such the “patronage package”
became unappealing197. Under Hafiz Al-Assad, the patron-client relationship was
much easier to maintain, by the time his son had assumed presidency, it was
faced with an overwhelming increase in the population, and as such the state had
lost its capacity to maintain the patron-client relationship.
Consequences on the environment have also caused discontent within the
public, the unemployment problem has lead many poor rural workers to migrate to
city centers coupled with the housing problem in Syria has caused many areas of
Damascus to turn into slums198. In the last few years, the economic hardships were
taking a heavy toll especially on the rural areas of the north and south, areas which
were considered strong supports of the Assad regime. Uneven development brought
about many problems which are associated with liberal economic policies such as
widening gaps between the rich and the poor and the continuance of crony capitalism,
a defining feature of the Assad regime199. The total effect of this economic
deterioration had an impact on the near cohesion of society achieved under Hafiz. As
a result of this society became “unstuck”. Which entails that different identity groups
began to separate from Pan-Arabism and started taking refuge in their own exclusive

196Butter,

David.Syria's Economy: Picking Up the Pieces. Report. Middle East and
North Africa Program, June 2015.pg, 11
197Elnur, Ibrahim. "The Implosion of Political Patronage Regimes in the Middle
Easr." In Egypt's Tahrir Revolution, by Dan Tschirgi, Walid Kazziha, and Sean F.
McMahon. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013.
198Raphaeli, Nimrod. "Syria's Fragile Economy." Middle East Review of International
Affairs 11, no. 2 (June 2007). 47
199Butter, David.Syria's Economy: Picking Up the Pieces. Report. Middle East and
North Africa Program, June 2015.pg, 11
88

identities.
4.8: Cracks within the Regime
Cracks appeared in the regime's loyalty to socialism under Bashar as he tried
to advance peace talks with both Israel and the West. He justified this through
explaining that "the Ba'th perceptions and ideologies have not become obsolete...
Socialism is a flexible perception that cannot be confined to a frozen and definitive
compartment, and for this reason it can be developed and promoted... The continuity
of the party depends on its capacity to adjust to today's reality in Syria and to
developments in the various areas of life in the state" 200.
The regime was progressively failing over the last few years in providing
welfare and goods and services. While from the early 1990s the regime allocated a
significant amount of money dedicated to welfare services, but the increase in
population was something that caused these resources to dissipate. In the final years
before the Arab Spring, the aftermath of globalization and modernization began
highlighting the failures of the regime. Syrians suffered from problems such as poor
infrastructure and frequent power cuts 201.
When Hafiz began gaining control Syria's population was around 6 million
people and by 2006 it had become 20 million202. This entailed that the rates of
urbanization increased in cities such as Damascus and Aleppo, and thus turned the
cities into slums where there were increased rates of unemployment and a general
lack of services. This further delegitimized the image of the ruling party which aimed
at "attracting and assimilating broad sectors of the disenfranchised, especially
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minorities and rural and peripheral populations. Under the leadership of the Alawites,
these sectors formed a 'coalition of the underprivileged' which brought the Ba'th Party
to power in 1963 and later enabled Hafiz Al-Assad to take over the government and
retain control of the country for close to 30 years"203. With this increase came a strong
sense of alienation of the people who are in these cities and further delegitimized the
image of the regime and by extension increasing the sectarian tensions between the
groups. Furthermore, the influx of Iraqi refugees caused the situation to expedite even
quicker with higher demand on a limited supply of goods. This is relevant to the
argument made by Jabar in which he wrote about how, in times of weakness, the state
will use identities to act as extensions of the state, and with the weakness of the state
to provide goods and services, the need for local kinship increases.
It was only a matter of time before the selective use of Ba’th nationalism fails
due to the tactics of both Hafiz and Bashar Al-Assad. For example, when it came time
to unify the people it stressed Syrian nationalism and highlighted equality and unity.
During the aftermath of the 1979 attack by Islamist extremist, it highlighted how the
Alawites were in danger as they are a minority. This framing feeds into the fears that
exist within minorities which as a result gains their reluctant support.
Bashar Al-Assad upgraded the authoritarian system which was set in place by
his father, while at the same time keeping many of its essential features such as the
nationalist rhetoric as keeper of the Arab cause against Israel204. Removal of Assad
from power is very difficult simply because he is protected by the system which was
placed by his father. The security forces are interlinked with the political elite who are
essentially his kin, tribesmen, as well as fellow Alawites. Therefore it becomes in
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their best interest to ensure that the regime survives205. Also, this tactic is essential in
order to ensure that there is no support base for coups. What held the Syrian state
together was a flawed Pan-Arab, socialist ideology, which can be argued as successful
right until the increase in the population which left many feeling marginalized, and
even adding more numbers to the different causes. With the rise of the civil war, the
regime lost its legitimacy with its monopoly over the use of violence, these deep
tensions resurfaced and then it became obvious these ethnic tensions were reactivated
and threatened the territorial integrity of the state206.The hardliners on both sides
become the more dominate voices with the rise of violence. As blood was spilled the
opposition went from calling for international intervention to calling for revenge
against the Alawites, and neither side can trust the other not to seek revenge and such
each held on to their own positions207.
The manipulative tactics of identity politics, which were used by Bashar AlAssad, had implications into the state of political opposition in Syria. Even within the
frame of bringing about change, the extent of long term sectarian division is evident
within the nature of the political opposition, even when it comes time to pressuring
the regime, getting the opposition to unite and make coalitions to overcome the
internal disagreements sectarian differences hampered their ability to truly unify208.
Bashar Al-Assad inherited a society which was in a state of near cohesion due
to the unifying efforts of Hafiz Al-Assad geared towards getting people to focus on
issues other than their sectarian divides. During the tenure of Bashar Al-Assad, he did
not change the system which was set in place by his father. In fact, he relied on many
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of the same tactics to further strengthen the system. The military was maintained as an
exclusive apparatus in order to protect the regime, and Bashar built upon the ideology
of Pan-Arabism and a nationalistic Syrian identity. One of the defining features of the
Bashar Al-Assad regime was globalization. The effects of globalization caused
socioeconomic problems such as a rising poverty. During difficult times of
socioeconomic problems people begin to revert to their own exclusive identity, thus
undoing much of the work which was done by his father. As these socioeconomic
problems increased, so did people’s tendency to revert to their own exclusive identity.
Eventually, these repercussions of globalization resulted in the discrediting of the
socialist ideology the Ba’th party was famous for. Therefore, as the regime lost its
legitimacy, an ideological vacuum was created and the societal bonds, that were
enforced by Hafiz Al-Assad in order to avoid the country demising into civil war,
weakened and eventually took its toll on the regime.
This chapter aimed at establishing connections between the implementation of
identity politics used by Hafiz and Bashar Al-Assad. Hafiz Al-Assad laid the
foundations for the modern Syrian state through constructing a system which would
ensure the power and survival of the Alawite as the political elite and empowering
some from within other sects and ethnicities through political and economic
favoritism in order to turn them into tools of the state. This succeeded in causing a
sense of alienation and resentment from other groups raising angry opposition. While
Hafiz may have laid the foundations of such a system, Bashar further enforced and
did nothing to change it, and arguably expanded on this system, ultimately causing
failures and having a direct impact on the current civil war.
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Chapter 5: Civil War
This chapter examines the causes of the civil war in Syria. It is important to
establish a basic assumption that through these events the country can be labeled as a
failed state. Moreover it will also examine the different ways in which identity was
used by both the regime and opposition and evidence that the use of identity as a
political tool which was used throughout Syrian history was a direct cause of the way
in which these events unfolded. It will also examine how the international forces
which sought to further their own interest contributed to the exacerbation of the
downfall of the Syrian state and its sectarian fragmentation.
5.1 Drivers of Civil War
The phrase ethnic conflict must be defined in order to begin to explain civil
war. Ethnic violence implies the conflict between two ethnically diverse groups or
more over economic, political, or social reasons. There are several explanations for
why civil wars happen some of them are systemic and some are international causes.
In order for a state be vulnerable to such events, it becomes apparent though different
conditions. The first condition is that two or more ethnic groups must live in close
proximity. The second reason is that authorities are too weak to ensure security,
leaving individuals to secure themselves209. These conditions are quite basic in order
to have a conflict be labeled as an ethnic one, the multitude of ethnicities may not be
the direct cause of civil way, in order for there to be conflict there must be tactics
resulting in societal fragmentation of some form in order to cause a sense of
resentment between the different groups.
The transition of these conflicts to civil wars can cause a state to fail as it no
longer becomes the main monopolizer of force and has generally lost the control over
209Wallensteen,

Peter. "Theoretical Developments in Understanding the Origins of
Civil War." In Routledge Handbook of Civil Wars. 1st ed. Routledge, 2014.pg, 39
93

some areas within the state. These conditions are generated often when states collapse
and ethnic groups have to provide their own security. As the state collapses,
individuals must find means to protect themselves and as such the state loses
legitimacy as it failed to provide basic services such as security. The state also loses it
ability to perform certain tasks such as tax collection. Tax collection from citizens
should be the basis for a responsive government, as it will, ultimately, give the
taxpayers more say in the running of state affairs (compared to state revenue from
rents from resources, tariff s or even development aid 210. As the state collapses it
loses it ability to offer public services or goods, which causes these services to be
given through informal channels. As such people’s motives become more complex
than if the state is functioning. People will turn to whatever entity offers these goods
and services be it militia or local identity which gives them the best chance at
survival. When such a breakdown occurs, the polity is fractured, but the dependencies
which were formulated before the state collapsed structure whatever system emerges
next. In the case of Syria, the local identities become a bases for political
organization. This process is quickly solidified as these political organizations begin
ensuring these services and a certain level of stability211. Accompanied with the
collapse of the state, comes the collapse of institutions as they begin to lose control
over their duties in some areas within the country. As Dodge points out, “the collapse
of a state’s institutional capacity means the loss of national authority but also of the
central focus for identity formation. In the aftermath of state failure, authoritative
institutions, societal and political, quickly lose their capacity”212. Because the state
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has lost its coercive control, the geographical borders of the state become meaningless
as decision-making leaks out into neighboring regions and international players are
drawn into the conflict.
Structural changes within the state can often be a precursor to ethnic conflicts
and eventually civil war. As the civil war unfolded, ethnic and identity conflicts
became increasingly visible and conspicuous, however, beneath the façade of violence
the economy of Syria seemed to be deteriorating so as to become a major cause for
the disruption of the polity and the society. As the state became further incapable of
providing services, people began relying on their local identities for services such as
security. Modernization and urbanization can create “increasing perceptions of
hierarchy”213. These increasing perceptions of hierarchy are prevalent in Syria, for
example, in some Alawite dominated areas, there is better infrastructure.
Furthermore, state failure driven by ethnic conflict often lead ethnic groups to
resort to offense as opposed to defense due to a multitude of reasons, such as fear of
antagonism of other ethnic groups. Emotions play a pivotal role in ethnic violence,
emotions such as fear, hatred and resentment are essential in understanding ethnic
violence as they can be drivers in causing seemingly rational human beings to
abandon their rationality and commit mass violence. Fear, for example, can cause one
group to attach another under the perception that it is a greater threat. Hatred and rage
can cause people to attack a group which has been attacked before or frequently
which shows how “ancient hate” can still be a driving force amongst the different
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sects or groups214. Resentment in which a group attacks another that is perceived as
higher in society due to their ethnicity215.
In addition to state collapse being a condition for ethnic conflicts, there are
several causes which can lead to the exacerbation of these ethnic conflicts such as
perceptual explanations in which authoritarian regimes will often frame events in
order to create their own political myths in order to suit their own purposes 216. The
loss of state control can entail the breakdown of law and order in the form of mass
scale violence and secessionist movements. These can act as catalysts of state failure
as the state can no longer provide services such as protection as resources are being
directed towards combating crime and violence. For these reasons, armed conflict and
politically motivated violence act as catalysts for state failure217.
5.2 The Regime and Identity Politics
The civil war in Syria can be credited to the secularist policy the Ba’th regime
perpetuated throughout many of its years, “the more sect-neutral a state appears, the
more society can divorce sectarian identity from political interest thereby sapping the
politicization of sectarian identities that has been underway for some time”218. While
Assad advocated secularism, his policies only served to reinforce the rule of a
minority in a state which can only be labeled as a form of secular sectarianism. What
fuels this form of political organization is the idea of victimization whereby
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“competing forms of sectarian victimhood at play in several countries relating to
contentious national historical memories and perceptions of sectarian oppression and
entitlement”219. Moreover without the resolution of such differences communal
relations will always be a point of contention.
The regime as employed many tactics in order to ensure its resilience. Despite
the fact that its use of identity politics being one of the main reasons this conflict
turned into an ethnic conflict, the regime continued to use many of the same tactics.
“The officers and men of the most sensitive and strategically important armed units
were Alawis… and the regime realistically preferred to trust only these units with the
task of dealing with popular disturbances… The regime proportioned the army in a
way in which most of the soldiers were Alawite”220. Comparisons can be drawn to the
tactics which were employed by the French, in which the use of identity within the
army only serves to raise ethnic tension, thus blurring the lines. Having a mostly
Alawite army, causes people to associate the sect with the repression thus causing
animosity between the different sects as one is seen as the perpetuator of this violence
and bloodshed. With this tactic it causes a shift in motives and as opposed to people
opposing the regime they become aggravated with a sect that is tasked with repressing
them.
Assad relied on two types of paramilitary forces the first being the shabiha, who
are made up of mostly Alawite criminal elements who evidence has shown are tied to
the Syrian regime and are responsible for the worst of the brutality against the Sunni
opposition in this current conflict. These groups were initially used as smuggling
groups and were lead by two of Hafiz Al-Assad’s nephews and eventually began
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being used as an intimidation tactic by the regime. During this conflict when they
were faced with a majority Sunni opposition, they loyalties fell behind Bashar AlAssad221. In an interview conducted the criteria for those chosen to join their ranks
they are chosen based on “physical strength, lack of education and blind loyalty to the
Alawite sect and the Assad family in particular” 222. Media is also a very important
tool for the civil war in Syria with both the regime and the rebels attempting to gain
the upper hand with regards to the message that is being sent abroad as well as
domestically.
The propaganda has escalated tensions between the different groups in Syria.
The paramilitary factions represent a tool used by the regime to terrorize the different
sects. The regime would use these groups as an intimidation tactic in order to get the
support of the other sects within the state in order to gain their support out of fear as
well as intimidating Sunnis through crimes. This only serves to increase the hatred
against the Alawites as they have come to represent the repression tool of the regime.
Amongst their tactics of intimidation is the forced displacement of Sunnis from
Alawite majority areas through terrorization tactics forcing Sunnis to flee to other
Sunni majority areas223. These paramilitary forces focus primarily on Sunni villages
which only serves to increase tensions between the different groups which is reflected
in narratives such as that of one of the Shabiba fighters who argued that “Sunni
women are giving birth to babies who will fight us in the years to come, so we have
the right to fight anyone who can hurt us in the future”224.
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Organized state violence and communal organization along ethnic lines is largely
the by-product of the relentless repression of the Assad regime225. The Syrian Civil
war has only served to “empower sectarian and ethnic entrepreneurs to mobilize
society along communalistic lines” 226. Deeper fractures have appeared as the rural
areas have rebelled even further more than the city centers which reflects the regime’s
overall negligence227. This can be linked to the fact that the regime no longer
provides welfare and as such people, begin to feel closer to their local identity as well
as pointing towards a policy of favoritism within the regime towards Alawite
dominated areas. The Alawites in Homs were largely seen as being favored through
the fact that they receive better services, infrastructure, and employment and as such
there most of the those who were protesting were of the Sunni sect228.
Religion also serves important tool in the propaganda war of the regime.
Religious framing of situations representation another form of the application of
identity politics, as the regime gave ultimatums to the Sunni clerics essentially forcing
them to include the legitimacy of the regime in the sermons. Some clerics included
anti protester sentiments such as discussing how these protests were not aimed at
reform, but at crippling Syria. One of Syria’s senior cleric said in his sermons that he
had seen reports and documents regarding the protests and then in his sermons
claimed, “they don’t want our Islamic civilization to flourish, they seek to destroy our
Islamic culture” “Those who want to bring down the regime want to bring down
Islam”229. This only serves to create tensions between the different sects as well as
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within the Sunni sect, as Sunnis feel resentment over the fact that these clerics are
essentially supporting the violence as opposed to condemning it.
Assad had the support of other minorities such as the Druze, Christians and
other Shiite sects and Sunnis who were part of the crony capitalists which he and his
father had empowered in order to act like a support group for the Alawite regime 230.
It claimed to uphold secularism in the face of extremism, yet actively worked to drive
a wedge between the Sunnis and Shiites in the country to the extent to which at border
control soldiers are wary and distrustful of Sunnis 231. The government framed the
rebels as radical Sunni Muslims, and then used the fact that when the rebels fire
missiles at residential areas as proof. There is an economic perception which drives
conflict such as the perception that all Christians are rich, and when Christians are
kidnapped, the ransom money asked is in dollars. Rebels are labeled as “takfiris” in
order to incite fear and hatred on behalf of minorities who fear the rise of radicals who
will curb their freedoms232. This represents a form of “othering” aimed at establishing
differences amongst the groups as well as framing the opposition in a negative light.
5.3 Repercussions
Both sides use identity or ethnicity as a political tool in order to generate
support. Moderates “may seek to enflame ethnic passion to secure a wavering base of
support and focus extreme action outward, aimed at another ethnic group. On the
other hand, extremists will stoke ethnic violence and the larger ethnic community to
force moderates to move toward a more extreme and/or violent position or risk losing
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all credibility”233. Extremists will seek to attack civilians in order to prompt a violent
response from the state in order to gain credit to their claims that the state is in face
illegitimate and needs to be replaced.
As a result of the conflict, there has been a systemic breakdown of the state
along sectarian lines. On the ground, groups comprised of minorities who seek to
protect their own neighborhoods234. While the regime may have been dominated by
the Alawites, after the civil war, many have kept supporting the regime out of fear
that they will be punished for the crimes that were committed by the Assad family for
the past 40 years. As a result there has been movement of Alawite families to Alawite
villages fearing the Sunni villages235. These fears are not without base, while
moderates may regard the Alawites as innocent victims of the House of Assad, many
extremists disagree and as a result advocate mass violence. This has extended towards
the Christian minority who have heard chants including “al-Alawi alataboot, wa alMashihiala Beirut” (the Alawi to the coffin and the Christian to Beirut) 236. This has
placed many of these groups in a difficult choice between “the shield of the secular
dictatorship, or the risks and rewards of democratic politics”237. This atmosphere is
creating a tension which drove tragedies such as the tragic event in Aqreb, in which
the pro-regime paramilitary forces killed and slaughtered their own children, women,
and men claiming that it was better than if the Free Syrian Army gotten to them first.
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There are many lessons to be drawn from the situation in Iraq after the fall of
Saddam Hussein. Like Iraq, is dominated by sectarian politics which has been a
deciding factor in politics. The Iraqi people much like the Syrians were dominated by
a minority in an artificial Shia dominated system, and is comprised of minority
groups238. In Iraq the minority ruling (Sunnis) have been excluded from the decision
making process through "the practice of de-Ba'athification... even through informal
means, ultimately stigmatizing and alienating Ba'th party members, especially those
who are Sunni" 239. Even until today the members of the Sunni community protest
against the Maliki government because they suffer from high rates of unemployment,
live under a permanent threat of arrest, and have been marginalized and treated as
second-class citizens 240.
In regards to the Kurdish movements, they had a measure of mistrust towards
the other opposition members regarding whether they would recognize their demands
of equal citizenship and power sharing and calculated as follows “were Syria to
experience a devastating civil war that would result in a weak and divided state,
Kurdish interests would be better served by limited involvement with the
revolutionary movement and by creating facts on the ground, namely de facto
autonomy as their Iraqi kin have done”241. As a result of this the regime has
withdrawn from Kurdish areas counting on tensions between Kurds and opposition
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242

. The Druze were politically smart and negotiated deals with both sides and as such

avoiding the violence as much as possible.
There is no consensus regarding the Kurdish demands, yet many if not most
seek a similar situation as the Kurds in Iraq whereby they create an autonomous
region within a federal state, where they can “assert their distinct identity, lay claim to
resources and cultivate external alliances”243. Basic demands included, that people
should have citizenship as Syrians, that they be taught in Kurdish and even be taught
Kurdish history. The name of Syria should be changed to reflect that it has other
ethnicities, from the Syrian Arab Republic to the Syrian Republic.
The Democratic Union Party, a more radical Kurdish movement deployed
troops and took over government buildings. The Kurdish issue shows how the state’s
repression can often lead to movements such as these developing. Bashar Al-Assad
had later on offered the Kurds citizenship, but even this was a poly to drive a wedge
between the radical and non radical Kurdish movements. Moreover, his withdrawal
from the Kurdish regions is evidence of further indicates how Assad is counting on
tensions between the Arabs and the Kurds to incite further violence which he can
capitalize on. As of 2014, the Kurds declared autonomy in three provinces in
Northern Syria244.
5.4 The International Dimension
The events within the Syrian borders are not isolated and do not develop
within a vacuum. Since the beginning of the events, the world watched with a sense of
apprehension with regards to how these events would unfold. As they became more
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violent, different regimes began intervening and further maneuvering the scene in
order to achieve their own ends thus creating a Cold War fought through proxies
being played out within Syria. The development of events in Syria seemed to launch
what can only be called a Middle Eastern Cold War between, Saudi Arabia which is
supported by the Gulf countries, the US and EU while another group is led by Iran
which is supported by Hezbollah, Russia and China.
5.5 Supporters of the Assad Regime
Iran has been one of Syria’s closest allies and since Bashar rose to power,
these ties have only strengthened. Syria has allied itself with Iran and relied on it even
more during this conflict out of its sectarian affinity. Both countries thrive on their
anti-Western rhetoric which has only served the purpose of creating hatred towards
the West and gaining domestic support though uniting people against a common
enemy. Despite the fact that they have opposing ideologies, with Syria advocating
secularism and Iran a theocracy, both regimes allied over their mutual points of
contention with Western powers such as the US and Israel. The Iranian Revolution
had an impact across the Islamic world, polarizing opinions and mobilizing sectarian
identities. Iran has been seen as a regional threat to the predominantly Sunni
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. As regional regimes felt threatened by the
Islamic Revolution Iran, they sought to discredit the revolution in any way possible
245

.
The location of Syria is essential in understanding why many countries have

taken such interest to it. The fact that it shares borders with both Iraq and Lebanon has
created fears over a spillover effect, essentially destabilizing the nearby counties. The
violence within Syria is also amplified by the fact that it is close to other countries
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with similar ethnic conflicts, thus threatening to fuel ethnic conflicts in neighboring
countries such as Lebanon and Iraq246. There are many reasons that Iran has supported
the Assad regime since the initial phases of the protests. Iran and Hezbollah are
backing the Assad regime out of sectarian loyalty. The alliance with Syria is very
important for Iran as they share similar goals and strategies, such as blaming the West
for the problems in the region. When the Arab Spring first began, Iran saw it as part
of the great “Islamic awakening” and hailed the uprisings as countries rejecting the
Western appointed autocrats247. At first it began denying the uprising in Syria, but
became very apprehensive as the events grew out of the control of the Syrian state.
They began thwarting the events through providing support in the form of experts to
help in internet and communication monitoring, experts in ways to circumvent the
sanctions that would be placed on Syria, intelligence sharing and counter insurgency
advisors, personnel and security forces as well as weaponry and artillery248. They also
took a propaganda role with advocating the uprising as part of a conspiracy by the
West249. It insisted that these events were a plot by the US and even painted them in a
very anti nationalistic element by labeling protestors as “agents” and
“mercenaries”250. Furthermore, Iran trained mostly Shiite troops from Lebanon and
Alawite troops in Syria 251. What this causes is an unfair advantage and creating
further violence to create more tensions within the entire state. The unwavering
support on behalf of Iran is based on the fact that Syria is one of its few remaining
allies within the region and therefore through maneuvering the political scene on the
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ground through the use of weapons and even personnel such as Hezbollah it only
seeks to advance its own interests.
Another country which is a strong supporter of Assad is Iraq. The irony of the
Iraqi support is that Iraq has had a history of political use of identity under the
Saddam Hussein regime and the fact that a Sunni minority ruled the Shi’a majority.
Yet despite this, the Syrian civil war has threatened to reignite sectarian tensions in
Iraq, with its then prime minister Nuri Al-Maliki who had just successfully managed
to take control of the country by defeating Sunni as well as competing Shi’a groups.
Syria still harbored members of the remnants of the Iraqi Ba’th party, thus causing
tensions between both countries 252. The Iraqi position is a source of confusion due to
the fact that despite the tense relationship between both countries, it maintained a
relationship with Syria, offering moral support. Al-Maliki, now a Vice President in
Iraq, feared that the success of a Sunni upheaval in Syria would cause a similar
uprising in Iraq. Iraq helped Syria through providing oil and refusing to isolate Syria.
There is also concern with the Kurdish movement which might threaten the control of
Al-Maliki as well as further threaten the territorial integrity of the Iraqi state.
On a more international level, Russia and China have been staunch supporters
of the Assad regime due to their economic interests within the state. Russia and Syria
have had strong historic ties under the Soviet Union and more recently economic and
military ties. Syria provides one of the few remaining areas where it can interject in
Middle Eastern affairs. In addition to supporting Assad, both countries have gone
through great lengths to block any resolutions in the Security Council. Neither
country wants to see precedents passed which could possibly be used against them in
the future. China’s support for Al-Assad stems from their economic interests that are
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tied up within the country. Furthermore, the Chinese did not want to set a precedent to
allow intervention as was allowed in Libya which eventually caused instability in the
country.
The different supporters of Assad share a common characteristic; their use of
pragmatism. Different scholars have pointed that while these members have been
openly supporting Assad, some have spoken to the opposition in order to guarantee
that no matter the outcome of the Assad regime, their interests are still secure.
5.6 Supporters of the Opposition
Early on in the conflict the Gulf powers tried to pressure Assad to conduct
minor political concessions and lift restrictions on the Muslim Brotherhood which
would allow for some inclusion of opposition without regime change253. Assad only
responded with uncompromising resolve and the situation deteriorated very quickly.
Even within the Gulf states there was competing interests to the way they prefer to see
the Syrian situation play out 254. The Sunni countries want Assad gone in order to
curtail the strength of Hezbollah and Iran. Saudi Arabia saw Syria’s future in tribal
groups who had a presence in both Syria and the Saudi Arabia, as well as groups who
embraced Salafism255. The relationship between Syria and Saudi deteriorated after the
assassination of Rafiq Hariri256. Once Assad began appearing like he would not last,
Saudi Arabia embraced the idea of a reduced influence of Iran and then became more
forceful in their calls for Assad to leave. And as the events deteriorated even further,
Saudi Arabia, along with the other Gulf countries armed the more extreme Islamist
rebels in an attempt to skewer the odds in their favor. Ultimately should Assad fall
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and there be elections, the Sunni majority would surely take over government thus
increasing the support of Saudi Arabia in the region. Qatar saw its support in the
Muslim Brotherhood, and even furthered this by forceful propaganda through its
channel Al Jazeera. Also, in 2009, Qatar wanted to build a pipeline which would
transport its gas through Syria and eventually provided gas to Europe competing with
Russia257. Assad refused to sign this deal and signed one with Iran which would
export gas to Lebanon. This irked the West as Syria would have another lucrative
income. This declared him an enemy to US corporate interests258.The UAE disagreed
due to their hatred of the Muslim Brotherhood and saw their future with a stronger
National Council which would help rule Syria.
The Lebanese government took a policy of dissociation from the entire
conflict in fear of the fact that it would have a similar affect on its own fragile internal
politics. From the Syrian perspective, it is essential that Lebanon is to remain within
its sphere of influence as they have deep economic and political ties. Economically,
Lebanon has provided jobs for over one million Syrians thus relieving the pressure on
behalf of the government to provide jobs 259. This conflict only served to energize
some of the detractors in Lebanon. Due to the fact that Lebanon shares a border with
Syria, it has been causing tensions on both sides. As the events within Syria escalated,
some of Assad’s allies in Lebanon were engaging in the events such as the Shi’a,
Christian, and a notably small Alawite group. Within Lebanon, the Sunni community
was still feeling bitter over the Syrian occupation and was seeking revenge. There is
evidence that there has been a spillover effect, in a port city in Lebanon for example,
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Sunni and Alawite combatants engaged in fighting that was eventually settled through
the military 260. Another point of concern for the Lebanese government is the idea of
opposition forces seeking to bring the battle to Lebanon to punish Hezbollah for its
participation in the civil war261.
On a more international level, the United States and the European Union have
been the main powers that have been staunch supporters of the rebels. The irony was
their support of protestors in Egypt and Tunisia, meanwhile trying to quell the protests
in Bahrain. The unfolding situations in Iraq and Libya have only grown to show that
intervention aimed at regime change rarely leads to positive results and even
empowering more radical forces to take over the country. Their concern stems from
the hostility of the Syrian regime; there is concern that in a last ditch effort to hold on
to control it would initiate hostilities with Israel thus causing a regional war dragging
the West into a ground assault262. As a way to intervene without pushing towards an
all ground assault, the US began overseeing a secret training program to the rebels by
shipping weapons, thus further creating complications within the ground263.
This chapter discussed two main points, the first being how the Syrian civil
war represents a compilation of years of implementation of identity politics on behalf
of the Assad regime. Through empowering some and not others they have created a
sense of hostility and hatred towards the other sects, which has been capitalized on
repeatedly by the regime. They fostered a sense of competition for economic benefits
and state patronage, thus fostering feelings of “us” and a “them” this only serves to
strengthen individual group identities and creating intergroup tensions, eventually
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causing hatred, mistrust and animosity hampering any possibly negotiation between
the different groups. The violence that has broken out since the beginning of the civil
war has shown how ethnic mistrust can lead to hatred and eventually violence as a
means of revenge and appeasement. The response from the regime represents its core
security mentality of not tolerating dissent. The hate speech is further exacerbating the
tensions between groups. For example, Sunni clerics use hate speech and take
advantage of Sunni animosity towards the Shia’ people and he uses events such as
Banias massacre in which the regime killed hundreds in a Sunni village as revenge for
the death of troops 264. The regime was banking on an armed conflict in order to
solidify the position of the regime and make the opposition appear weak and divide
them265. With the level of ethnic violence it is very unlikely that in years to come
there will be feelings of trust amongst the groups. There will be the creation of new
symbols of sectarian identity which will be built upon trauma and a sense of
victimhood that is now part of both the Sunni and Shia’ sects. The second part of this
chapter has sought to examine the breakdown the different interests of the different
world powers which are involved in the Syrian civil war. The support of each of these
countries to a certain group only exacerbates the conflicts in the political scene in
what can be labeled as a proxy war to achieve personal gains that can have
devastating results on the entire region. The support in the form of arms and artillery
only serve to create unfair advantages of the different groups and causing the rise of
extremists and sideling the moderates. And as such further fueling the ethnic violence
which has been unraveling. Civil wars which have international involvement typically
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last longer, have more casualties, and are more difficult to resolve266. In the context of
the Syrian case, the implementation of identity politics in order to achieve personal
gains, can only result in massive losses.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
In conclusion, identity plays a vital role in the way politics is practiced as it
directly affects the cognitive process of an individual. Specifically in the Middle East,
identity is a building block in the formations of groups, loyalties and is a determinant
of mass movements. Through analyzing the role of identity in Syria, a state with
heterogeneous identity groups, it is apparent that identity plays a critical role as it has
been a tool of the different regimes for many years. This research uses a constructivist
approach, but it should be mentioned that this study is limited in the fact that no
ground research has been conducted due to the state of affairs in Syria. Under the
French colonial period, in order to prevent the formation of a nationalist movement,
separate ethnofederal states were formed. Furthermore, the French employed a divide
and conquer technique in order to divide the Syrian people while simultaneously
laying the seeds of sectarianism. This was done through through forming a military
which was comprised primarily of minorities which created a sense of resentment
from the Sunnis as well as pinning the different leaders of the ethnofederal state
against each other. While this system of ethnofederalism was abolished, the
consequences of such as system is maintained.
When Hafiz Al-Assad rose to power he trusted a select few who were
members of his sect and tribe, and as such a primarily Alawite dominant regime was
formed. In order to consolidate such a regime he ensured that the state’s main
coercive apparatuses were controlled by those who had a vested interest in the
maintenance of the Alawite dominant regime. In order to ensure that the state does not
break up into civil war, he advocated secularism while at the same time reinforcing
sectarianism through is favoritism policies towards the Alawites. Al-Assad also chose
a select few from other sects and empowered them through patronage in order to
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guarantee their support. This created resentment from the Sunnis who felt that they
deserved more representation in the system, as well as resentment towards the Sunnis
who were given preferential treatment.
The extent of the “secular sectarianism” employed by Hafiz is evident in the
development of opposition groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood some of whom,
advocated armed violence in order to overturn the predominantly Alawite system.
With the death of Hafiz Al-Assad and the smooth transition of his son into power,
people were optimistic that the young liberal would usher in an era of political
change, yet Bashar Al-Assad did nothing to change the status quo. In fact, he
reinforced secular sectarianism through more favoritism policies. This resulted in
mistrust and resentment amongst the different sects. Throughout his term as president
there have been problems in the regime’s ability to advocate its legitimacy as failures
were beginning to compound, creating an ideological crisis within the party.
As Syrians began to demonstrate against the regime for its oppressive policies,
the protestors were met with violence from an army which was formulated in a way to
ensure the protection of a regime with a minority complex. The Arab Spring gave an
opportunity for the local identities in Syria to be reactivated. Furthermore, as the state
descended into a state of civil war, it became incapable of providing services and this
resulted in people relying on their local identities to provide services such as security
and welfare, and thus the reactivation of these local identities with the Arab Spring.
Bashar Al-Assad capitalized on this violence through framing the conflict as a rise of
radical Islamists in order to incite fear amongst the different minorities into
supporting his regime.
The events of the Arab Spring in Syria have only caused a failure of the state
and a strengthening of the local identities with some groups such as the Kurds seeking
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autonomy and thus threatening the territorial integrity of the state leaving little hope
of leaving a “unified” Syria intact.
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